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3Abstract 
 
The primary aim of this thesis is to read some novels of J M Coetzee in terms of the philosophy of 
Emmanuel Levinas which puts ethics before ontology. 
 
Levinas’s ethics are concerned simply with respecting and being responsible for the alterity of the 
Other. Another way of saying this is that the Other’s material needs are my spiritual needs.  In this 
philosophy there is no system or methodology which would allow the Other to be reduced to the 
Same. 
 
My reading focuses upon the concepts of Saying, Testimony and Fecundity and highlights the 
alterity of the Other as central to an understanding of the thought of both Coetzee and Levinas. 
 
In the first chapter I examine the use of the Saying and the Said. While there is of course no Saying 
without a Said, my thesis shows how this Saying opens up a discourse that has within it an 
ambiguity that not only refuses closure, but also resists hierarchy and does not have an authorial 
presence. There is no hint of moralizing, of saying how things should be but, rather, an indication of 
how things are. The Saying is diachronic insofar as it produces time from the relationship with the 
Other. Time is anachronic in its emergence from the relationship with the Other when it recuperates 
the past.  In Chapter two I show that this is achieved in testimony which specifically redeems the 
past by mourning those gone before. Chapter three explores how messianicity, which is also 
anachronic, is seen in fecundity in which the Other to come which comes as an event can come 
now. 
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6INTRODUCTION 
 
J.M. Coetzee suggests in “The Novel in Africa”, that the novel is only half alive until it is given 
voice; “it wakes up when the voice breathes into it, when it is spoken aloud.”(9). According to the 
philosopher Emmanuel Levinas in the Holocaust or Shoah, the literal, the rational, the ocular has 
gained complete ascendancy over difference, voice, literature and ultimately over life. The visual of 
man the hunter has triumphed over the spoken voice of the fraternal human.  This assertion of what 
Levinas terms ‘the Said’ over ‘the Saying’ will only cease when the ethical comes before ontology 
and the connection between Saying and Said is understood. Paradoxically, neither the Saying nor 
the Said can exist alone. Another way of conceptualising this is in terms of a seriature.1 The 
ethicality of Levinas is maintained in his writing by a tying and untying of knots. The Said is the 
knots and the Saying is a rope which can be seen as a metaphor for the relationship between the 
Saying and the Said. As Derrida explains: 
 
“Seria” is also the idea of a series that is the necessity of a proliferation of gestures, 
particular each time […] It talks about the necessity of linking.  In a chain, thus there is 
always the same metaphor of rope, chain, shuttle.  The necessity of linking gestures or 
moments that do not let themselves be linked, which are absolutely singular every time. And 
one has to link singularities, that is put in series things that do not let themselves be put into 
series.  (Negotiation 4). 
 
With this definition in mind I will use the writing and thought of Levinas to read Coetzee and vice 
versa. 
 
Levinas’s thought is the product of an intriguing political, social and intellectual confluence.  
Levinas grew up in Lithuania where he was steeped in Russian literature. He experienced at first 
hand the devastation of Hitler and Stalin and he saw in the thought of Heidegger a particular 
nemesis that needed to be countered.  He countered it by putting ethics before ontology.  Coetzee is 
an English speaking South African raised in a totalitarian state devoted to the separation of races.  
His literary achievements include two Booker prizes and the Nobel prize for literature.  He currently 
lives and works in Australia. 
 
1 The etymology of a seriature is linked to cord or rope. 
7I will argue that in Coetzee’s work, we have an art recuperating in its Testimony, its Saying and its 
Fecundity, a process of recollecting (welcoming) and opening up the future, not the future present, 
but a future that inhabits a different order of time. We will see that the Other in its ethicality is 
something that shines in the literary works of Coetzee.  For Levinas  “the Other”2 is an absolute 
transcendence, which beyond being leaves traces in the face of the other person.  Levinas says 
traces not signs.  A sign presupposes the existence and availability of a referent.  A trace is a 
catechresis (though Levinas does not use this word) for something or someone I can never confront 
directly, some thing truly other.  These traces belong to a “past absolutely bygone” or, as Hillis 
Miller has put it:  “The Other was never present and can never be made present” ( Miller, Black 
Holes 199).  
 
The Other is something that opens up to the possibility of a justice that can come now.  The Saying, 
which is a testifying to infinity and fecundity, is a breaking out of the closure of the Said; it is an 
opening to the Other that ruptures the totality of a thought that revels in the literal and rational, and 
opens time to the messianic which is not for Levinas, a time of the coming of the wholly other in 
the future, but something that can happen now. 
 
This thesis will demonstrate that the explicit connection between ethics, as theorised by Levinas, 
and literature is that both can be understood as Sayings on the other side of the Said.  Like Coetzee, 
in opposition to the visual, Levinas prefers the aural.  This is where he believes the ethical is most 
emphatic.  Here the voice resonates as it becomes most developed in its work of movement towards 
the Other: 
 
Sound in all repercussion, outburst, scandal. While in vision a form espouses a content and 
soothes it, sound is like the sensible quality overflowing its limits, the incapacity of form to 
hold its content – that by which the world that is here prolongs a dimension inconvertible 
into vision (Levinas, Outside the Subject 147–8). 
 
The links between the Saying, Testimony and Fecundity lie in a transcendence of its voice. This 
transcendence is what I call the Middle Voice: that is, the voice that refuses in its ethicality to 
appropriate the Other, or be appropriated. It is evident I believe in the writing of J. M. Coetzee, who 
rejoices in refusing the closure the Said brings.  This voice rejects the binaries, the hierarchies and 
the closure of a representation that denies the Other.  Instead it rejoices in the face to face, which 
 
2 When I use Other, I mean the human Other. When I mean God I use the term the wholly Other. The human Other is in 
Levinas’s usage also wholly Other. 
8always testifies in its cymballing to Infinity.  This Middle Voice testifies, in its breaking out of the 
closure of appropriation or being appropriated, to an ethics that comes before ontology or as 
Levinas calls it ‘an ethics beyond ethics.’ In this thesis whenever I use the word ethics I will be 
following Levinas’s usage. Hutchens explains what ethics means for Levinas: 
 
Emmanuel Levinas is not exclusively a critic of modern Western rationality. He is more 
widely esteemed as a visionary thinker who explores the neglected status of ethics. He 
contends that his is no mere ethics among competing ethics but an ‘ethics of ethics’, that is 
very roughly the study of the manner in which foreignness, inexplicability and 
unpredictability shape the human condition despite the often arrogant demands of 
rationalism.(16) 
 
There are many ways to read a text. Derek Attridge in The Singularity of Literature describes a 
literary work as: 
 
an act, an event, of reading, never entirely separable from the act – event (or act events) of 
writing that brought it into being as a potentially readable text, never entirely insulated from 
the contingencies of the history into which it is projected and within which it is read.  The 
statement that a work is not an object but an event may be a truism, but it is a truism whose 
implications have generally been resisted.  In spite of a long history of critiques of the 
notion of literature as constative –Benjamin sums up a whole tradition when he says that the 
essential quality of the literary work is “is not statement or the imparting of information” 
(Illuminations 70) […] We still talk about “structure” and meaning and ask what a work is 
about in a manner that suggests a static object transcending time permanently available for 
our inspection. (59) 
 
We are still using our Greek heritage when we say such things as the work is an object. Descartes 
questioned the objectified world that Greek philosophy gave us replacing it with a dual world of 
subject and object.  This dualism partially continued the objective world of the Greeks. It has taken 
phenomenology starting with Husserl and carried on by Heidegger and Levinas and others, to see us 
existing in the world rather than looking at it as an object. 
 
Attridge suggests the instrumentalisation of literature in both the “intrinsic and the market sense” 
has led to the “diminishing of the literary within the textual domain, and to the uniqueness of each 
literary object”(Attridge, Singularity 10). Like Attridge, I argue that the philosophy of Levinas 
9provides an ethical platform, one that steps outside of a determinate history, thus opening up the 
possibility of an opening to the Other3 that transcends the Being of beings and the closure that lies 
therein. Through close readings of key passages in several novels I intend to show that Coetzee’s 
work can be read in terms of Levinas’s theories of the Saying and the Said, Testimony and 
Fecundity.  In this way I extend the work of Attridge and other commentators on Coetzee by 
showing in detail how Levinas and Coetzee resonate. 
 
Reading the work of Coetzee through the lens of Levinasian philosophy is not common practice.  
However others have also found Levinas a useful thinker through which to read enigmatic narrative 
in general and the work of Coetzee in particular.  In addition to Attridge, others who have found 
Levinas useful or challenging include Jacques Derrida, Brian Macaskill, David Atwell, Michael 
Marais, Fiona Probyn, Deborah Bird Rose, Timothy Strode and Gilbert Yeo. The work carves a 
unique trail through the philosophy and novels to explore three central concerns: Saying, Fecundity 
and Testimony.  
 
Jill Robbins adroitly summarises Levinas’s largely negative position on literature in Altered 
Reading: Levinas and Literature. She does note, though, his later regard for the ethical significance 
of writing on the Holocaust, and for the work of such writers as Paul Celan, William Shakespeare, 
Maurice Blanchot and Fyodor Dostoevsky amongst others. Levinas argues that Célan’s poetry is 
emblematic of an unbridled questioning of a world that denies the alterity of the Other.  Dostoevsky 
has the polyphony of multiple voices that refuses the dogmatism so much a part of nondialogism. 
Interestingly, Robbins finds in rhetoric which Levinas argues against, the possibility of an ethical 
difference that Levinas was blind to. She believes that for Levinas, art that has significance 
ethically, does not function aesthetically. 
 
This development is quite significant as it shows that Levinas’s earlier problem with art was 
in fact a problem with images that freeze time and thus deny transcendence, which is to 
deny the alterity of the Other. This suggests that it is not art as oral expression or art as 
literature, but it is art as image or representation of the Other that he is concerned about.  
 
Levinas argues against the Western philosophical and political category of the individual, which 
tends to reduce the Other to the Same, in favour of an ethics based on the fraternal. It is a 
philosophy that argues against ontotheology in favour of the Other, and it has religious roots in the 
sense that it is relational and messianic, focused on the Other rather than focused on the self, 
 
3 See J Hillis Miller’s Black Holes for an interesting discussion on “the other”, 155 – 69. 
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although it is important to note that it is not theist or deist. John D. Caputo goes to some lengths in 
The Prayers & Tears of Jacques Derrida to elaborate Derrida’s thought on messianicity so that it is 
not confused with the messianism locked in the thought of a determinate God which is one that is 
knowable. This would mean reducing God to the Same which is what ontotheology does. 
 
Levinas provides a philosophy in which, unlike in Heidegger, ethics is placed before ontology and 
thus avoids the reduction of justice, as the rule of law, into ethics.  This reduction has, according to 
Oona Ajstenstat:  
 
an impulse to realize an ideal society or to build perfect institutions. The political idealist 
conceives of his own understanding as encompassing both justice and ethics, that is, as a 
realization of the ethical on the level of the third. And once a society believes itself to have 
such a foundation nothing can hold it back from violence. (61)   
 
It is important to maintain a strong separation between ethics and justice so that it is possible to 
criticize violence that is justified in the name of justice. 
The political idealist conceives of his own understanding as encompassing both justice and 
ethics, that is as a realization of the ethical on the level of the third. It is according to 
Levinas, the societies or regimes founded on this understanding that are the most destructive 
(Ajzenstat 61). 
 
Levinas has this to say about violence in the very first part of Totality and Infinity:
Violence does not consist so much in injuring and annihilating persons as in interrupting 
their continuity, making them play roles in which they no longer recognize themselves, 
making them betray not only commitments but their own substance, making them carry out 
actions that will destroy every possibility for action (21). 
 
Levinas here amplifies the point and makes clear that violence is not restricted to war as such. 
Rather violence is manifest in the limitations that the System or Totality imposes on the Other. 
 
Violence is a term that is theorized in many ways and is one with which both Coetzee and Levinas 
are very concerned. Following Levinas, I will define political idealism as that which reduces the 
Other to the Same.  He sees it as the politics of the Shoah, the politics of genocide, the politics of 
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domination, the politics of exclusion and oppression. It stands in stark contrast to his ethics, which 
puts the Other first, accepting a responsibility for, and making welcome, the Other. This is 
antithetical to the politics of the West with its unrelenting endorsement of the individual. However 
it is necessary to note that the ethics of Levinas engages with a heavily contested philosophical 
concept. 
 
Ethics as theorised by Aristotle is teleological and as such directed toward the happiness of the 
individual. Kant’s account of the categorical imperative in Groundwork of the Metaphysics of 
Morals, where one should “act only according to that maxim whereby you can at the same time will 
that it should become a universal law.” (30) ultimately subordinating ethics to ontology, has had a 
profound influence on modern western intellectual culture. 
 
There may well be no escaping the influence of Hegel on philosophy and consequently on our 
reading of literature. Hegel believed Christianity would eventually secularize and that it was 
possible to have a faith without works; thus, any compassion for the Other was unnecessary. He 
epitomised an ideology that promoted the State over the Other. Frederick Beiser argues that Hegel 
chose a middle path between paganism and Christianity (136). Beiser adroitly argues that, “Hegel 
wanted to divinise nature and history as much as to naturalise and historicise the divine” (138). 
Hegel is anathema to Levinas, who regards his totalising discourse as fundamentally opposed to the 
Other.  
 
Ajzenstat explains Levinas’s view on Hegel in this way:  
 
Hegelianism is a monism or ontology that explains everything by means of the overarching 
rubric of the historical plan thus undermining particularity and individuality; and 
totalitarianism and progressivist liberalism put this kind of thinking into practice – since 
both ideologies see world history as marching toward a time when human beings will be 
fulfilled because they have everything in common. (9) 
 
In putting ethics before ontology, Levinas radically opens up the possibility of a different kind of 
justice which comes from a responsibility to the Other rather than from a historical movement 
towards a single human destiny. He redefines ethics and relates it to ontology in this way: 
 
This distinction between the ethical and the moral is very important here.  By morality 
I mean a series of rules relating to social behaviour and civic duty.  But while morality 
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thus operates in the socio-political order of organizing and improving our human 
survival it is ultimately founded on an ethical responsibility toward the other.  As 
prima philosophia, ethics cannot itself legislate for society or produce rules of conduct 
whereby society might be revolutionized or transformed […]When I talk of ethics as 
‘disinter-estedness’, I do not mean that it is indifference; I simply mean that it is a form 
of vigilant passivity to the call of the other which precedes our interest in being, our 
inter-est, as a being-in-the-world attached to property and appropriating what is other 
than itself to itself.   
Morality is what governs the world of political ‘interestedness’, the social interchanges 
between citizens in a society.  Ethics, as the extreme exposure and sensitivity of one 
subjectivity to another, becomes morality and hardens its skin as soon as we move into 
the political world of the impersonal ‘third’ – the world of government, institutions, 
tribunals, prisons, schools, committees, and so on. (qtd in Ajzenstat 50) 
 
In this context, to read Otherwise than Being is what, following Levinas, I call reading Judaically, 
as distinct from reading Hellenistically, which is to read a story thematically or allegorically or 
instrumentally.4 A Judaic reading is one that searches for the discontinuities, the fractures, the 
ruptures.  A Judaic reading notes the ambiguity, the lack of closure, and the questioning of the 
status quo. It rejoices in multiple meanings. It is very much open to the Other and, as such, is 
ethical. 
Attridge refers to the singularity of literature as its “difference from other forms” (Attridge, 
Singularity 3).  He goes on to say:  
 
that literature, understood in its difference from other kinds of writing (and other kinds of 
reading ), solves no problems and saves no souls, nevertheless, as will become clear, I do 
insist that it is effective even if its effects are not predictable enough to serve a political or 
moral program.(4) 
 
Like Attridge, I see the literature of Coetzee as exemplifying this singularity. 
Susan Gallagher, Nadine Gordimer, David Atwell, Derek Attridge and Michael Marais are but a 
few who have difficulty placing Coetzee in any particular literary stream. Coetzee is also very 
unhelpful in placing himself.  What little he has said has been a refusal to be placed or categorised 
“I tend to resist invitations to interpret my own fiction.  If there were a better, clearer, shorter way 
 
4 The distinction between Jewish philosophy and Greek philosophy is very significant. See Irene Kajon (7 – 8) for a 
discussion on Hermann Cohen, Franz Rosenwieg, Martin Buber, Leo Strauss and Emmanuel Levinas and their dialogue 
with Western Humanism.  Also very useful is Lev Shestov’s Athens and Jerusalem.
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of saying what the fiction says, then why not scrap the fiction” (Coetzee “Interview” 1). His 
language betrays an ambiguity of thought and practice.  This ambiguity can be understood in terms 
of his refusal to be reduced to a being in time and place. For this reason his use of language and his 
representations are intensely concerned with relations rather than with representations of landscape 
or place.   
 
In spite of this the work of J M Coetzee has often been read according to frameworks that are more 
or less explicitly ‘postcolonial’ owing to his South African upbringing and subject-matter. During 
the Apartheid regime Coetzee was criticised by many of his peers for refusing to offer an explicit 
critique of South African politics.  The most vociferous has been Nadine Gordimer who regards the 
writer in South Africa as having a certain responsibility to challenge the injustice of the State.  In 
“The Idea of Gardening” she was scathing about the work of Coetzee and others such as Breyten 
Breytenbach and André Brink. She suggests that the fact that “not one of them published anything 
that was banned shows how they turned away astonishingly, from the deepest realities of the life 
going on around them” (Gordimer qtd in Gallagher 8).  Nevertheless, his writing and living in 
postcolonising countries points to the possibility of a postcolonial approach in reading his work. 
 
Postcolonial approaches are broad and sometimes contested methodologies when used in relation to 
the study of “culture affected by the imperial process from the moment of colonization to the 
present day”(Ashcroft 2).  Postcolonial theory finds expression, for example, in the study of 
transnationalism, globalization, neo-colonialism and modernization. Postcolonial literatures are 
distinctively those which are “formed out of the experience of colonization and asserted themselves 
by foregrounding the tension with the imperial power, and by emphasising their differences from 
the assumptions of the imperial centre” (Ashcroft 2).  
 
Postcolonialism is also to some extent the product of an academy that has been involved in 
questioning imperialism and its subsequent oppression and domination of Indigenous people all 
over the world. Yet at the same time, as Mark Sanders shows, in Complicities, intellectuals can be 
and are often complicit with the same system they oppose.5 Sanders drawing particularly from 
Derrida’s ruminations on Heidegger in Of Spirit, asks whether: 
 
5 Rey Chow in Ethics After Idealism may also support this view in the way she links colonialism and “contemporary 
white liberalist intellectualist trends” (32). The suggestion here is that the tendency to complicity is made manifest and 
developed in academic postcoloniality where texts are read in terms that tend to apply conscience to issues emerging in 
postcolonial countries.  
 
14
The history of the intellectual and apartheid–whether of support, accommodation, or 
resistance–can in these terms be deciphered, not by fixing on apartness alone, but by 
tracking interventions, marked by degrees of affirmation and disavowal, in a continuum of 
foldedness or responsibility in complicity? (11)  
 
And as he goes on to say: “This is to write the history of the intellectual – a history in which there is 
no responsibility without the troubling and enabling moment of complicity” (18).  
 
Like Sanders, Coetzee is aware, as Sue Kossew notes, of “the complicity of his own discourse, he is 
suspicious of the kind of social-realism or literature of commitment that sees the writer in South 
Africa, in particular, as the diagnostic organ of the body politic” (Critical Essays on J. M. Coetzee
6). She quotes his significant remarks6 about where his allegiances lie: 
 
It seems to me that what you are trying to do is to absorb certain novels, my novels, into a 
political discourse [….] And what I am now resisting is the attempt to swallow my novels 
into a political discourse [….] So that attempts to swallow up the intention that lies in or 
behind a book of mine —I have to resist them because, frankly, my allegiances lie with the 
discourse of the novels and not with the discourse of politics. (6) 
 
It is possible that intellectuals, attempting to detach themselves from the system in which they are 
implicated by invoking the political project of ‘postcolonialism’ in their readings of literary texts, 
may not be able to affect power relations strongly, although in their teaching or writing they can 
make people very aware of the problem of colonialism, which is in itself important. In this context I 
would suggest that like colonialism, postcolonialism has an historical understanding of political and 
moral redemption that is related to a Christian understanding of messianicity and a Hegelian 
understanding of history. We will see that Derrida, drawing on Levinas, has a different 
understanding of messianicity that is ahistorical and aontological.  It posits the coming of justice as 
an event that can come now rather than in some future time such as the end of history.  There is in 
this thought a strong resistance to closure and totality (Caputo 117). 
 
As Ajzenstat also explains, Levinas has: 
 
6 In an interview with Alan Thorold and Richard Wicksteed entitled “Grubbing for the Ideological Implications. A clash 
more or less with J M Coetzee” published in a University of Cape Town publication , Sjambok. Cited in Dovey  The 
Novels of J M Coetzee: Lacanian Allegories. (55) 
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an ahistorical aontological understanding of messianism in which the coming of the 
messiah has nothing to do with ontological transformation in a historical future and 
everything to do with ethical transformation in the here and now. (15) 
 
Once ethics is reduced to a set of rules organised to regulate behaviour, and politics is understood as 
‘interestedness’, then both ethics and politics are collapsed into morality. In this context, a 
postcolonial reading of literature can be understood as an instrumental reading designed to achieve 
a specific result; that is a change in the status quo.  It has, as such, a specific teleology and a closure 
to others and is questionable in Levinas’s terms (Attridge, The Singularity of Literature 7). As 
Attridge puts it, an instrumental reading is one that: “judges the literary work according to a pre-
existing schema of values, on a utilitarian model that reflects a primary interest somewhere other 
than in literature”(13). Following this, my study will argue that justice can only truly come about if 
ethics is positioned outside of a narrow vision of politics and morality, where it is characterised by 
its openness to questioning. Rather than being understood in terms of the rule of law, literature and 
its reading could be seen as something like Derrida’s understanding of Levinasian ethics in: “the 
straightforwardness of the welcome made to the face” (Derrida Force of Law 250).  
 
The relationship between ethics, politics and justice is of course not simple, as the variety of critical 
responses to the literature of Coetzee illustrates. There has been considerable discussion about the 
role of allegory in Coetzee’s writing which highlights the complex relationships between politics, 
morality and ethics which Levinas disentangles and reconfigures. An allegory can be very simply 
defined as a reading of a story in which “An extended narrative that carries with it a second 
meaning along with the surface story.  The continuity of the second meaning involves an analogous 
structure of ideas or events (frequently historical or political); this extended metaphor distinguishes 
allegory from mere allusion or symbolic ambiguity” (Beckson 8).  Allegory is a complex modality 
with its didactic and apocalyptic functions pointing to a central controlling power.7 To read a text 
allegorically is to read a text with ideas or elements as symbols for broader meanings. Allegory can 
be said to have its roots in a classical humanism which is centred on the achievement of a secular 
“freedom” evinced in terms of a particular class or the private world of the individual.  This 
spurious freedom is not the freedom of Levinas which exists only in terms of a responsibility for the 
Other. Allegory is a way of dealing with a known universe or the world as we know it.  It is unable 
to deal with the unknown or unknowable. As such it deals with a closed, moral universe. With its 
 
7 Paul de Man in Allegories of Reading discusses the highly original and complex work of Walter Benjamin.  Susan A. 
Handelman in Fragments of Redemption, offers an interesting discussion of the role of allegory and a critique of the 
way Paul De Man totalizes the work of Benjamin on allegory. 
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connotations of hierarchy and power, allegory is antithetical to a Levinasian ethics because allegory 
attempts to reduce the Other to the Same.  
 
The thought of Levinas is centred on relations between people finding Infinity in the Other. In this 
way the other person is unknowable and cannot be reduced to an allegory which demands 
knowability of the other and an ontotheology. As Hutchens explains: 
 
There are aspects of human existence that can never be known, and indeed, it is best for us 
that these things continue to keep their secrets.  This is what Levinas means when he 
reiterates that infinity always resists totality, the other always ‘overflows’ the same: no 
matter how much we come to know, it is always something resisting or disrupting the 
perimeters of the known.  Only through an exploration of this overflowing, this resistance 
and disruption, can the ultimate principle of ethics be articulated – responsibility (17). 
 
In this context I suggest that allegory has no room for the Other who is wholly Other.  Literature 
demands an ethics that goes beyond the closure inherent in morality or, as Attridge puts it:  
“Allegory announces a moral code, literature invites an ethical response” (Ethics of Reading 64). 
 
In Reality and its Shadow Levinas reminds us that in a discussion over primacy with respect of art 
and nature there is a failure to recognize “the simultaneity of truth and image” (136).  Allegory is 
entailed in the relationship between the art work and its image.   
 
An allegory is not a simple auxiliary to thought, a way of rendering an abstraction concrete 
and popular for childrens’ minds, a poor man’s symbol.  It is an ambiguous commerce with 
reality in which reality does not refer to itself but to its reflection, shadow.  An allegory thus 
represents what in the object itself doubles it up.  An image, we can say, is an allegory of 
being [….]  
The whole of reality bears on its face its own reality outside of its revelation and its truth. In 
utilizing images art not only reflects, but brings about this allegory.  In art allegory is 
introduced into the world as truth is accomplished in cognition.   These are two 
contemporary possibilities of being. (Levinas 6)  
 
What this unequivocally means for me is that the seriature of the Saying and the Said can be related 
to Levinasian thought on allegory. The philosopher conceptualises the Saying in a particular, ethical 
relationship to the Said such that the Said can be related to allegory which is ruptured by the Saying 
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of criticism. Hence the powerful role of allegory in shaping images and understanding the world 
means that “the task of criticism remains essential, even if God were not dead, but only exiled” 
(Levinas, “Reality and its Shadow” 13) 
 
Several commentators argue that Coetzee is also significantly concerned with the function and form 
of allegory. Bill Ashcroft regards Coetzee as writing allegorically so as to operate within history 
and thus dismantle the dominant discourse. He regards allegory as opening up the resistance of 
reading and this is the function of the allegory of this novel itself” (Ashcroft, Irony 109).  Stephen 
Slemon regards Coetzee’s use of allegory as a counter discursive project designed to “expose the 
investment of allegory in the colonising project and thus to identify allegorical modes of cognition 
as the enemy of cultural decolonisation” (Kossew, Critical 10). They believe that Coetzee uses 
allegory to explode it disrupting allegory by inhabiting it. 
 
Gordimer also responds to the centrality of allegory and messianic themes within Coetzee’s novels 
but realises, with reference specifically to the Life & Times of Michael K.: “The abstraction of 
allegory and symbol will not give access to what is most important in this magnificent novel, 
however.  Neither will seeing it as a vision of the future” (Critical 141). This echoes Coetzee’s 
recoil from realism to regard the novel as something living beyond formulaic writing and as such 
engaged in the quest of realising human potential rather than the advocacy of a particular politics. 
As he says: “I would like to think that the novel today is after a bigger game than the critical realist 
type” (qtd in Kossew, Critical Essays on J. M. Coetzee). Levinas in a very important passage 
undermines realism: 
 
Those who would like to uphold the Other or the Transcendent will find but a disappointing 
recourse in realism.  Realism affirms the transcendent by defining it through the idea of 
being, but the idea of being is fundamentally adequate to and adjusted to the Same. (Basic 
Writings 12) 
 
Dominic Head argues that: 
 
Allegory can be seen as a device for concealing […] transgressive or heretical ideas, since 
the encoding of a message makes it harder to recover […] Coetzee is clear however that 
such strategic thinking is fruitless. (Coetzee 22) 
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Whilst he acknowledges that Coetzee’s work can be generally read as an allegory of South Africa, 
particularly Waiting for the Barbarians, Head suggests that later works such as Life & Times of 
Michael K. could be read as allegories of the Western Condition. However Attridge regards 
allegorical readings of Coetzee as perhaps inherently problematic because: 
 
The danger they court is of moving too quickly beyond the novel to find its significance 
elsewhere, of treating it not as an inventive literary work drawing us into unfamiliar 
emotional and cognitive territory but as a reminder of what we already know only too well. 
(Ethics of Reading 43) 
 
Gallagher whilst acknowledging that Coetzee can be read allegorically believes that: 
 
Coetzee’s novels clearly are not realistic; they neither reflect the social world as it appears to 
most readers nor give the reader the illusion of actual and ordinary experience. (45) 
 
Allegory could be simply defined as a representation that has a meaning other than the literal as 
Attridge does. In this scenario the opposition between the literal and the allegorical is one where the 
literal is construed as literary and the case made that as such it is not given to interpretation.  An 
example of a secular allegory is Animal Farm with the farm animals having very human 
characteristics. The moral of the story could be that humans do behave like animals. A more 
Christian allegory may be found in the stories of C.S. Lewis. Kafka apparently was read by Thomas 
Mann as an allegory for the metaphysical quest for God. Some think that Lord of the Rings was an 
allegory of the first and second World Wars, but Tolkien has emphatically denied this. Allegory 
requires a totalising conception of the world to map onto. Benjamin writing about allegory tells the 
story of the automaton who can always win at chess. The automaton is a puppet who sits at a table 
underneath which is a dwarf who directs the puppet.  The puppet is, in a commentary to the story 
given by Benjamin, historical materialism and the dwarf is theology. (Kelley 260).The point is that 
there is in allegory an idealist or onto-theological background that is often implicit and 
unacknowledged. Levinas is trenchant about idealism: 
 
The eternal return of idealism does not result from a capricious preference for the theory of 
knowledge on the part of philosophers.  It rests upon solid reasons which found the privilege 
of the Same in comparison with the Other. (12) 
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This thought of allegory is not easily reconciled with anything Otherwise than Being. The denial of 
alterity in reading literature allegorically denies the very singularity of literature which is its 
inherent openness to Otherness. The reduction of literature to a closed totality is the very antithesis 
of Levinasian Ethics. 
 
I believe there is a choice in how a text is read.  Some texts of course lend themselves to certain 
ways of reading, others are more resistant. A text can be read literally, allegorically, instrumentally 
or anagogically.  The assumptions a reader makes regarding time, language and reality ultimately 
determine the reading.  This thesis attempts to give some indications about how to read Coetzee by 
elucidating some of the ideas of Levinas as a guide to a reading that goes beyond the literal, the 
allegorical or instrumental without denying the possibilities or validity of these readings. In a 
nutshell, allegory requires minimally some kind of idealism and a set of rules to guide the reader. 
This system or totality implies a closure antithetical to my understanding of Levinas.  Levinas has 
an ethics that does not readily resonate with the ethics of Kant or Aristotle. It is also significant that 
the ethics of Aristotle is reduced to the law and as such is antithetical to putting ethics before 
politics.  
 
Reading Coetzee through the philosophy of Levinas requires a resolute stepping beyond allegory.  
At the same time as I say this, allegory is very much like Hegel.  That is , it is impossible to step 
away from.  In this thesis I show how aspects of Levinas interms of the Saying, Testimony and 
Fecundity enable a reading that steps beyond allegory but at the same time cannot entirely forego it. 
 
Caryl Philips’ overview of Coetzee's work The Master of Petersburgh in an article “Life & Times of 
John C.” , creates a revealing portrait of Coetzee’s marked lack of interest in representation.  
Coetzee’s work relentlessly refuses to represent reality either topographically or in terms of subject 
descriptions. It is marked by a lack of realism or idealism. Instead Coetzee is endlessly concerned 
with relations between people, that is, between ego and the Other and the Otherness of the Other.  
He is consistently concerned with authority and the authoring of the Other by the Same.   In an 
“Interview” with David Attwell, Coetzee made these perceptive remarks about writing and ethics: 
 
Turning to the question of what way of life is best for the extreme soul. I would say that 
what you call the literary life, or any other way of life that provides means for interrogation 
of our existence–in the case of the writer fantasy, symbolization, storytelling–seems to me a 
good life–good in the sense of being ethically responsible. (1) 
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In “Writing with Eyes Shut: Politics and the Problem of the Other in the Fiction of JM Coetzee”, 
Michael Marais explores the relationship between ethics and politics in Coetzee's fiction arguing 
that it has an ethical value in the way it passively affects the reader. Marais questions postcolonial 
theory and the assumption that the text’s “engagement with history is premised on active 
intervention or effectivity.”(43)  He argues further that the “literary text may engage with history by 
passively affecting the reader”(43).Whereas postcolonial theory, which is concerned with the 
political act, would attempt to give voice to the Other as a counter discourse, Coetzee would refuse 
to give voice to the Other since he “attempts to form a relationship with the Other outside of 
history” (45).   He consistently questions forms of representation, and in particular, anything to do 
with the ocular, which he sees as being involved in the reduction of the Other to the Same.8 Marais 
regards Coetzee as being committed to an engagement with the interface between politics and ethics 
or, in Levinasian terms, with interrupting all totalities with infinity.  
 
Lidan Lin argues that Coetzee’s rhetoric of simultaneity enables his work to break out of the 
“cultural, ethnic and ethical insularity implicitly embodied in the nativism, negative nationalism and 
Euro-American multiculturalism that have informed postcolonial writing” (1).  By breaking these 
confines Coetzee has chosen to write not about the ‘provincial’ but about the “universal” (1). For 
Coetzee the only relationship is one “based on responsibility, trust and ethical understanding”(12). 
 
For Levinas, the relationship between the self and the Other is inextricably connected to a third 
party as the place from which resistance to injustice comes. As he puts it: 
 
If there was only the other facing me, I would say to the very end: I owe him everything. I 
am for him.  And this even holds for the harm he does me: I am not his equal, I am 
forevermore subject to him.  My resistance begins when the harm he does me is done to a 
third party who is also my neighbour.  It is the third party who is the source of justice, and 
thereby of justified repression; it is the violence suffered by the third party that justifies 
stopping the violence of the other with violence. (Levinas, Of God 83) 
 
The importance of the third party, that is the other Others can not be understated.  It reminds me 
forcefully that we live in community not in isolation.  The essence of Levinas is the asymmetrical 
relation with the Other and the other Others. When I write about the Other and the relationship with 
that Other there is within this implicitly the third party.  The introduction of the third party is where 
 
8 For a more detailed account of the relationship between regimes of power and ocularcentrism see Martin Jay’s 
Downcast Eyes: The Denigration of Vision in Twentieth Century Thought.
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the politics of justice enters the scene. It is here that the obligation to resist injustice on behalf of the 
Other is made. What must be remembered though is that the Other comes before the third party. 
That is ethics comes before politics. The Other must come before the other Others. Geoffrey 
Hartman in The Longest Shadow argues that the Nazi disaster and the values that produced it are 
integral to Western society. Forgetting or denying or shifting responsibility onto the past dooms us 
to relive that past as present.  The importance of witnessing to that past is absolutely crucial to 
redeeming it, and it concerns everyone. 
 
The following chapters will explain how Coetzee’s works unsettle our present by opening up the 
past9 and force a confrontation with it which is significant to our future.  I read Coetzee in terms of 
the time of the relationship with the Other which also constitutes the conditions for the ethical self. I 
will argue that time is diachronic, anachronic and messianic as it deals with the Other, the past and 
the future respectively. Where ethics precedes egology or cosmology as Levinas argues: 
 
A relationship with the Other is time. It is an untotalizable diachrony in which one 
moment pursues another without ever being able to retrieve it, to catch up with or 
coincide with it. The nonsimultaneous and nonpresent is my primary rapport with the 
Other in time. Time means the Other is forever beyond me, irreducible to the 
synchrony of the Same. (75) 
 
In other words the nonsynchronic aspect of Time ensures the relationship.  To dispense with the 
nonsimultaneous and nonpresent aspects of time would collapse the relationship, reducing the Other 
to the Same. The ethical achievement of Coetzee’s literary efforts lie in his refusal to speak with 
authority and thus avoiding the reduction of the Other to the Same. (Coetzee, Diary 124). 
 
9 Roger McLure in The Philosophy of Time gives an interesting discussion of different ways of reading Time. In 
particular in chapter 3. “The time beyond being.” 
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Chapter 1 
The Saying  
 
Your hand full of hours, you came to me – and I said: 
Your hair is not brown. 
So you lifted it lightly onto the scales of grief; it 
Weighed more than I… 
 Paul Célan (“Your Hand Full of Hours” 23) 
 
The Saying and the Said are key terms used by Levinas to describe ethical language. In this chapter 
I use some novels of Coetzee to show that the distinction between these terms can be illustrated, 
through a notion of a Middle Voice. A number of theorists such as John Lewellyn, Theresa Dovey, 
Brian Macaskill and John Peradotto have posited the importance of the Middle Voice as significant 
in cultural and critical theory. Derrida in The Margins of Philosophy regards différance as 
indicating the Middle Voice.  Derrida describes différance as being neither active nor passive and 
suggests that philosophy constituted itself by repressing this Middle Voice, by distributing it into 
active or passive voices. (9)  Différance means not only to differ but also to defer. It indicates 
something to come, we know not what, but it is uncontained by any horizon. In this it has a 
prophetic dimension. In German the Middle Voice is regarded as being part of an action or event.  It 
is not seen as acting on an object in the process of an event.  I contrast this with writing that 
employs the Subject – Verb – Object sequence. This is a voice that controls or dominates but does 
not relate. The Middle Voice contains both active and passive voices and eludes forming an 
identity. It thus has a distinct prophetic or messianic dimension that is indisputably linked to justice. 
It is neither dominant of the Other and nor is it accepting of domination. As a consequence, it is a 
voice that elects to show a responsibility for the Other. Herein lies its ethicality, an ethicality that 
comes before the morality so beloved of those who live in a world of rules and laws. The Middle 
Voice which I have deemed ethical has existence in an asymmetrical relation with the Other and the 
third party, that is the other Others. As I mentioned in the Introduction the Other must come before 
the other Others.  That is the ethics must come before the politics.  Any other treatment will result 
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in at best a shift in power and a maintenance of the carnage of violence.   The following reading of 
Coetzee will link the idea of a Middle Voice to Levinasian concepts of the Saying and the Said. In 
particular I will examine how his novels explore the possibility of a Saying that liberates the Said 
from the closure of the present. 
 
It is important in reading texts, whatever they are, to be mindful of what Levinas calls “the 
prophetic dignity of language, always capable of meaning more than it says” (Greenberg 292).  
Derrida writes about this phenomenon in a different way in referring to différance as having a 
messianic dimension.   Meaning is never fixed as it is always yet to come. Susan Handelman notes 
how Levinas claims that language “contains more than it contains” (283). Its ‘Saying’ is more than 
its ‘Said’.  She goes on to say that it “can bear meanings other than those intended in its use as 
instruments for transmitting thoughts or information” (Handelman 283). 
 
There are aspects of Levinas and Coetzee’s concern with the Middle-Voice that relate to Bakhtin’s 
idea of the ‘centrifugal voice’. 
Pam Morris says: 
 
To construct an image is for Bakhtin, the fundamental act of artistic visualisation.  The term 
implies a position of outsidedness to that which is perceived; what is self – identical can 
never become an image.  However to construct another (human being) into an image implies 
a sense of mastery over or, at least, an encompassing and enclosing knowledge of the other.  
Bakhtin avoids this by shifting from a visual plastic image of the human being to an image 
of voice.  The other is heard as a discourse, and a discourse always represents a view of the 
world; the perception from which the consciousness speaks. (97) 
 
There is much in this passage that can be unpacked.  Bakhtin’s centrifugal voice is a voice that goes 
in all directions to undermine or subvert the authority of discourse.  The subverted discourse may be 
that of received history or that of another novel and its particular ideology or monologues. The 
novel is the site where the Middle Voice which is the centrifugal force, is able to carnivalize 
literatures to subvert or invert and parody power structures leaving open the dialogue between hero 
and reader (Morris 250).  It is, I believe, also important to look at what Coetzee has to say about 
Dostoevsky and how he positions him with regard to Bakhtin, because Bakhtin and Dostoevsky 
both rejoice in the voice, which they posit in contrast to the visual as distinctly relational:   
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From Bakhtin the value of dialogism has entered critical currency.  A fully dialogical novel 
is one in which there is no dominating, central authorial consciousness, and therefore asserts 
no claims to truth or authority, only competing voices or discourses.  In Bakhtin’s account, 
Dostoevsky was the inventor (or re-inventor) and greatest practitioner of the dialogical 
novel, which he synthesized from other mixed and for the most part low status genres: the 
detective story, the picaresque tale, the saint’s life, the eve of execution confession. 
(Coetzee, Stranger Shores 145) 
 
This dialogical voice also speaks when silent with the silence often being more communicative than 
the noise. Coetzee goes on to say, and this is extremely important, that a tactical battle will not win 
a war whereas a strategic battle will. And this war against tyranny in its various manifestations will 
require: 
 
an opportunity to supply what is missing in Bakhtin, namely, a clear statement that 
dialogism as exemplified in the novels of Dostoevsky is a matter not of ideological position, 
still less of novelistic technique, but of the most radical intellectual and even spiritual 
courage. (Coetzee, Stranger Shores 145). 
 
The centrifugal force gives the novel its heteroglossic tone, with the clash of antagonistic social 
forces seen as traces of two or more discourses.  This is evident in particular in the way Coetzee’s 
novels inhabit other texts; such as Foe and Robinson Crusoe; the way differing classes and races 
intersect in Age of Iron; the way history is parodied in Life & Times of Michael K. with Michael 
K., for example, pushing his mother towards the Karoo in a parody of ‘The Great Trek’. This is a 
classic example of Coetzee rivalling rather than supplementing history and in this way subverting 
the consensual discourse that is used to maintain the status quo. Even more significant than this, 
though, is the way his work refuses to be enclosed by an instrumental reading. (Gallagher,142) 
 
Levinas posited two distinct world views: one Hellenic, the other Hebraic10. The novels of Coetzee 
can be understood in terms of the following contrast which Ajzenstadt explains in this way:  
 
As is well known, the juxtaposition Greek/Hebrew, as Levinas uses it, does the same work 
as several other juxtapositions he employs, including same/other, politics/ethics, said/saying, 
and totality/infinity. In each of these formulations, the first term refers to a way of thinking 
that pulls things together into a larger order, and the second term to a rupture that operates as 
 
10 The ‘Hebraic’ or ‘Judaic’ is a concept or term that is not referring to the current state of Israel. 
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thought’s origin and at the same time thought’s challenge (“Levinas Versus Levinas: 
Hebrew, Greek, and Linguistic Justice” 145). 
 
Erich Auerbach develops the distinction further in relation to the story of Odysseus and the story of 
Abraham and Isaac: 
 
On the one hand, externalised, uniformly illuminated phenomena, at a definite time and in a 
definite place, connected together without lacunae in a perpetual foreground; thoughts and 
feeling completely expressed; events taking place in leisurely fashion and with very little 
suspense.  On the other hand, the externalization of only so much of the phenomena as is 
necessary for the purpose of the narrative, all else left in obscurity; the decisive points of the 
narrative alone are emphasised, what lies between is nonexistent; time and place are 
undefined and call for interpretation;  thought and feeling remain unexpressed, are only 
suggested by the silence and the fragmentary speeches; the whole, permeated with the most 
unrelieved suspense and directed toward a single goal (and to that extent far more of a 
unity), remains mysterious and “fraught with background.” (Mimesis 11-12)  
 
Levinas regards the Hebraic as: 
 
Having some fundamental insight into plurality, diversity, alterity, infinity – into the fact 
that each human being is unique. (Ajzenstat, Driven Back To The Text 76) 
 
In contrast he sees the Hellenic as leading to the rational.  It is the language of the philosopher. It 
simply has no ambiguity and refuses to embrace the Other.  It is the Said. The Hebraic rejoices in 
ambiguity, refuses closure and is always open to the Other. It can be understood as literary in its 
opening to the irrational. It is the Saying.   
The Saying signifies to the Other in proximity and imbues within the subject a responsibility for the 
Other such that: 
 
To maintain that the relationship with a neighbour, incontestably set up in saying, is a 
responsibility for the neighbour, that saying is to respond to another, is to find no longer any 
limit or measure for this responsibility, which ‘in the memory of man’ has never been 
contracted, and is found to be at the mercy of the freedom and the fate, unverifiable by me, 
of the other man. (Levinas, Otherwise Than Being 47) 
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Levinas goes on to make clearer what this implies: 
 
The unblocking of communication, irreducible to the circulation of information which 
presupposes it, is accomplished in the saying.  It is not due to the contents that are inscribed 
in the said and transmitted to the interpretation and decoding due to the other.  It’s in the 
risky moving of oneself, in sincerity, the breaking up of inwardness and the abandon of all 
shelter, exposure to traumas, vulnerability. (48) 
 
The Saying occurs prior to the Said. It is the ethical that comes before the ontological. It is the 
responsibility to the Other. The Said is the message, the discourse.  It can be defined and lacks 
ambiguity. Whereas the Saying is indefinable, is ambiguous and is infinite.  The Saying defies 
definition and I have no choice but to skirt around it, pointing to it but never grasping it. As Simon 
Critchley puts it: 
 
With such an understanding of the structure of Levinas’s language, and in particular the 
writing style of Otherwise Than Being: the endless repetitions, the ellipses, ambiguities and 
contradictions, the unexplained and often tangential footnotes, the strange and austere 
beauty of the prose, the rhapsodic effect of the clause structure in Levinas’s extended 
sentences, the simultaneous didacticism and uncertainty of many of his propositions. These 
phenomena are not, I would claim of secondary importance, due to Levinas’s relentless 
obscurity, circumlocution, and inability to say what he means clearly and distinctly.  Rather, 
they are of primary importance, for it is precisely in the play of binding and unbinding, the 
oscillation or ambiguity of the saying and the said, that the ethical saying of Levinas’s work 
is maintained. (129) 
 
According to Steven Benko the relationship between the Saying and the Said, and Being is 
interesting and complex: 
 
Levinas writes that ‘behind every statement of being as its being, the saying overflows the 
very being it thematizes in stating it to the other.’ Where the saying is the exposure to 
alterity – exposure to the other – the said ‘is a statement, assertion or proposition of which 
the truth or falsity can be ascertained.’ Saying breaks through and relativizes the said by 
putting the said in question, performing a constant deconstruction of its themes. Eventually, 
every saying congeals into a said, alterity is absorbed into thematization, and that is why 
‘saying must be accompanied immediately by an unsaying, and the unsaying must again be 
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unsaid in its manner’, and there is no stopping; there are no definitive formulations. (Benko 
13) 
 
This also holds very true for Coetzee, whose writing conveys a relentless ambiguity in many 
dimensions. Coetzee gives us exemplary examples of Sayings in Age of Iron and Life & Times of
Michael K., as well as in his latest novel Slow Man.
In Age of Iron, Mrs Curren is a Classics lecturer, on the day she is diagnosed with cancer, receives 
an itinerant alcoholic, the enigmatic Mr Vercueil as a houseguest. He has an ambiguous role in her 
life, which she details in a last letter to her daughter and we read as the story of her last days; it is 
posted after her death by Mr Vercueil.  It is a testimony that inhabits a particular time while it 
questions and subverts a certain history in a testimonial in the form of a letter. The letter is a 
subversion of a history given by a ruling class, the history that justifies and promotes Apartheid as a 
rational national action. As a letter it invites a response; it is in this way open to the Other in a way 
a book is not.  But it is not a voice. There is a distance, an oppressive silence here.  It speaks from a 
past that cannot be reached, for which we can only mourn, calling into the future for justice in a 
different order of time. The silence, the voicelessness of the letter in its own time, speaks of the 
repression of that time.  It speaks of the death of not only Mrs Curren but the death of a people 
excluded, denied, ghettoised.  In its silence it also echoes the alterity of Mrs Curren.  To know her 
would be for Coetzee to give her a full representation that would invest her with a legitimating role 
in the totalitarianism pervasive in her time. The testimonial in the form of a letter effectively 
militates against any ontological closure.  It highlights, accentuates, the alterity of the Other. In the 
final chapter of the thesis, I will show how fecundity, as a notion of the healing of the past by the 
children of tomorrow, is well exemplified in Age of Iron, whose title speaks of the iron of the 
children who lose their childhood to gain a future from the destruction, the alienation, the suffering 
of the past and the present. It is exemplified in the deaths of John and Bheki at the hands of the 
police as they attempt to challenge the institutional violence with their own violence.   
 
Mr Vercueil in Age of Iron is another Saying in the Said.  He is another figure who is not given a 
full representation. He is also one who does not have a voice.  He is the Other of Mrs Curren, the 
old lady dying of cancer who is writing a letter to her daughter that will, she hopes, after her death, 
be posted by Mr Vercueil, a homeless derelict.  She is responsible for him.  She acts this out 
literally, giving him bread and shelter.  It is he who comforts and assists her in her death.  With the 
death sentence having been passed by the state-legislated medical officer in his institutional role of 
doctor, Mrs Curren is reduced to accepting the care of an itinerant alcoholic.  Such are the 
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paradoxes of life.  We know nothing of his past or his future.  Again, as we will see with Michael 
K., Mr Vercueil exhibits a remarkable anonymity.  We have only a cursory description of his 
bedding, his work habits and his general disposition. He is as enigmatic as Michael K., but with 
even less of an identity; he resists being appropriated or assimilated by the Same. He eludes capture. 
 
Life & Times of Michael K. exemplifies the Saying through the figure of Michael K. who has a 
cleft palate, is institutionalised at an early age and is considered inferior due to his colour. As a 
result of these and other influences, he decides to take his dying mother home to the Karoo.  She 
dies on the way, releasing him from what he has considered to be his life’s work.  He transfers his 
allegiance to mother earth and is detained by authorities in a number of camps.  The intervention of 
a medical officer highlights his extreme reluctance to Be. He seems to seek an alternative path that 
consists of going beyond Being.  There is a lack of disclosure in his identity which is never fully 
revealed, even though in his way he is intensely dialogic, not only with himself, but also with us, 
both in his activities and his passivity. It is his embodiment of the Middle Voice that overflows his 
being, thus giving him a being beyond Being.  As a disfigured, socially disadvantaged, coloured 
man he transcends the time and space of the institutionalised Apartheid of South Africa, attempting 
to find a middle path that eludes the binary oppositions so important to Hellenic language and 
philosophy.  His journey eludes those dichotomies of city/country and farming/gardening to express 
and to find an Other that eludes the totalising force of the master/slave dichotomy so beloved of 
political regimes.  He inscribes in his movement on the face of the country and city a Middle Voice 
that expresses, in the thought and hope of the Other, a future which escapes ontological closure.  As 
Middle Voice, Michael K. resists the closure of the Said, whilst at the same instant being open to 
the ambiguity of the Saying.  
 
Coetzee’s most recent novel, Slow Man, concerns the affairs, or the lack thereof, of Paul Raiment 
after he loses a leg in a bicycle accident.  It details his physical and social rehabilitation as he 
attempts to come to grips with his predicament.  He is assisted in this by a writer, Elizabeth 
Costello, and a nurse, Mrs Dokic, who attempt to bring him into contact with the mores and 
technology of the twenty–first century.  Traumatised by an exilic existence, he strenuously resists 
their encroachment on his historical time warp. His renunciation of technology, whether it be a 
prosthesis for his leg or a modified bike designed and built by the Dokic family, is indicative of his 
desire to be fixed in time and space. He is a historical fossil unable or unwilling to recognise the 
alterity of the Other. 
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Fiona Probyn suggests that the ethical and political questions worked through in the literature of 
Coetzee have an important gendered dimension.  She notes: “Coetzee’s use of the white woman 
narrator in three of his works […] In the Heart of the Country (1979), Foe (1986) and Age of Iron 
(1990) […] is closely aligned to the poststructuralist configuration of the feminine as necessarily 
disruptive of narrative” (1). The poststructural configuration of the feminine in its disruption of 
narrative is highlighted by such feminists as Luce Irigaray and Hélène Cixous.  They regard the 
fluidity and multiplicity of feminine writing as rupturing the logic of phallocentric discourse. 
Significantly this points to a “space beyond the logic of (phal)logocentric thinking”(1) This space or 
nonspace lies beyond the Being of beings. It elucidates an ethics of the alterity of the Other. Probyn 
goes on to argue that:  “Coetzee’s use of the feminine must instead be read in terms of  the broader 
impact of the feminine as a textual strategy in the elucidation of settler postcoloniality”(2). Probyn 
does have some concerns about Coetzee’s appropriation of difference feminism.  She also raises the 
question of gender and the Middle Voice (2) to be discussed in detail shortly.  She locates the white 
woman in Apartheid, ambivalently between the master and the slave.  This position whilst 
eschewing power and its alternative is one that opens up the possibility of a responsibility for the 
Other.  This is something that the women in Age of Iron, Disgrace and Slow Man develop with 
some alacrity.  Another way of arguing this is that for post-structuralist feminists and Coetzee, the 
feminine can be read as a Saying and, as such, as an ethicality that precedes and transcends the 
Said. 
 
Probyn notes how critics do not specify what type of feminism is being used in Coetzee’s work.  If 
of course he were using any other than what she describes as ‘difference feminism’ he would be 
reducing the Other to the Same. However difference feminism rooted in poststructuralist philosophy 
has within it a respect for the alterity of the Other. This point is crucial not only for the respect it 
gives to the Other but also for its chances of success if seen with the introduction of the third party 
where responsibility is extended to the alterity of all the Others. Looking closely at the text the 
following exchanges highlight this claim: 
 
From the touch of her hand he learns all he needs to know: that Marijana does not find this 
wasted and increasingly flabby body distasteful; that she is prepared, if she can, and if he 
will permit it, to transmit to him through her fingertips a fair quantum of her own ruddy 
good health. (Coetzee, Slow Man 63) 
 
She not only accepts him as he is, but gives to him the gift of her health.  It is a respect and a 
reponsibility for his Otherness.  It is something she would willingly extend to all the Others. This 
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gift is not restricted just to him.  She brings him with her to her family but at the same time he is 
distanced.  He is the face to face with her but also the third party or if you will the family is the third 
party that is all the Others.  The introduction of the third as Levinas noted problematises the face to 
face.  Politics as power, left to itself, leads to tyranny.  But already in the face to face there is the 
third party.  As Levinas says:  
 
In the measure that the face of the Other, relates us with the third party, the metaphysical 
relations of the I with the Other into the form of the We, aspires to a state, institutions, laws 
which are the source of universality. (Drabinski 195)  
 
In this remarkable passage there is an interweaving of a singularity of the face to face that is the 
ethical with the universality of the third party that is the political. Again I am reminded of the 
seriature of the Saying and the Said. In Slow Man we see the extension of the face to face of 
Marijanna and her patient into the relationships in her family where they give to her Others his 
alterity, his difference. 
 
Marijana gently explores his belief system, the sense of himself as one of the community: 
 
‘You think your leg grow again, Mr Rayment?’ she asks one day out of the blue. 
 
‘No I have never thought so.’ 
 
‘Still maybe you think so sometimes. Like baby. Baby think, you cut it off, it grow again. 
Know what I mean? But you are not baby, Mr Rayment. So why don’t you want this 
prosthese? Maybe you shy like a girl, eh? Maybe you think, you walk in street, everybody 
look at you. You wear prosthese, nobody look at you. Nobody know. Nobody 
care.’(Coetzee, Slow Man 62) 
 
I see Marijana JokiT as a Saying; that is as someone who is open to the Other in terms of a respect 
for the alterity of the Other and at the same time essaying a profound responsibility for the Other; 
Marijana is exemplary.  So is Elizabeth Costello. 
There are many instances in the text where Marijana demonstrates a candid care and concern for 
Paul that ruptures the economic exchange between them. This is made very clear with the bike as 
Paul admits: 
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A magnificent gift. 
Munificent too, he might add, but does not.  He knows what he pays Marijana; he can guess 
what Miroslav earns. Much more than I deserve. (Coetzee, Slow Man 254) 
 
Paul is very much aware that the economy of exchange that existed between them is ruptured by the 
gift of the prosthetic recumbent bicycle that the JokiT family manufacture for him, no doubt at 
Marijana’s instigation. He is shown a family that has no need for a godfather to shine over them. 
 
Elizabeth Costello is the Saying par excellence in this story with her almost ethereal arrivals and 
pronouncements that shatter the rational closure that Paul has spent a lifetime embracing.  She is 
relentlessly frustrated by Paul: 
 
‘Four people in four corners, moping, like tramps in Beckett, and myself in the middle, 
wasting time, being wasted by time.’(Coetzee, Slow Man 141) 
 
Paul picks this up: 
Being wasted by time: it is a plea of a kind that the woman is uttering. Why then is he so 
signally unmoved? (141) 
 
His conclusion is: 
 
None of us is able to feel for you.  You are the one outsider among us.  Your involvement, 
however well-meaning it may be, does not help us, merely confuses us.  Can you understand 
that? (141).  
 
Elizabeth Costello is beyond Being; caught, though, in an objective rational time frame out of 
which she is trying to lead Paul.  This time frame has an economy of closure, one that relentlessly 
demands a return for everything given whether good or bad, an economy that mitigates against the 
unknown and or unknowable. Elizabeth in her Saying, is an orchestra conductor pointing to the 
music of the JokiTs, noting Paul’s desire but nevertheless leading him to new territory.  Her work 
echoes that of Walter Benjamin’s Angel of History in that she can see the catastrophe of progress 
and, although apparently powerless against it, is resolute in her opposition.  It is, though, an 
opposition which flows with the narrative of history seeking to subvert it from within, in an attitude 
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of openness to the Other rather than a violent reduction of the Other to the Same. For Marijana, her 
Saying is constrained by her family obligations around which she orbits. Elizabeth is unconstrained 
by any orbit. Driven by a fear of the dark, of the unknowable, in its most elemental form, Paul 
attempts to close off the unknowable, the Saying of Elizabeth Costello.  
 
She is in this Saying similar to Mrs Curren, whose grief is experienced with the death of Bheki, the 
son of her housekeeper Florence and is extended, enveloping not only herself but all humanity. 
Bheki is murdered by the state security forces. When she finds him she sees “his eyes open and 
staring” (94). She thinks “Now my eyes are open and I can never close them again” (95). She has 
developed a political awareness that has at the same time killed.  She has metaphorically speaking 
died with Bheki.  
 
In the letter to her daughter, penned out of love – an emotion like no other, one that she directs to 
her daughter, but also one that is uncontainable and thus envelops not only Mrs Curren but all those 
she comes into contact with –she writes:  “It is the soul of you that I address, as it is the soul of me 
that will be left with you when this letter is over” (118).  
 
Her love is committed to writing where it will be preserved. The Saying that overflows the letter is 
an emotion of love.  The message is the Said.  The Said details what is happening to Mrs Curren 
and what she thinks and feels about her daughter who is the totally unknown and unknowable 
Other.  It is a love letter that mourns the loss of her child, the separation, the distance between them, 
the distance both in time and space. This is a distance that the letter like any story or testimony that 
overflows with love, will with its Middle Voice, be bridged. The letter incommensurably points to 
this bridging, a healing of the pain of separation. As such, it has a messianicity, which is an 
openness to a future event that comes in a different order of time, an event that is imbued with 
justice, and is encoded within it. 
 
Mrs Curren acknowledges a perception that Mr Vercueil has a certain uncanniness. His appearance 
on the day of her death sentence and his subsequent appearances all lend themselves to a perception 
of his being an angel sent to guide her since,as she says: 
 
It was too much of a coincidence.  I wondered whether you were not, if you will excuse the 
word, an angel come to show me the way.  Of course you were not, are not, cannot be – I 
see that.  But that is only half the story, isn’t it.  We half perceive but we also half create. 
(153) 
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She ponders to her daughter the relationship that has evolved between Mr Vercueil and herself.  She 
speaks of Vercueil’s limitations and her own, and the deepening dependency they have for each 
other: “the nearer the end comes the more faithful he is.  Yet still I have to guide his hand” (180).  
Neither one nor the other dominates.  This is not an appropriation of the Other by the Same. 
Vercueil, seeing her naked does not know her, cannot know her in her alterity.  There is only the 
Middle Voice, the Saying in all its undefinable complexity that irrevocably envelops the Said. Her 
pain is unmaking her world, ceasing its existence. With her letter she is creating a world that is 
ongoing. (Scarry 170)  
 
With each instant she is not only starting anew.  She is building a new self from the past and 
projecting it forcefully in her writing into the future. The Middle Voice is intensely diachronic, a 
point I will develop further in Chapter 3. Her last words are a question: “Is it time” (Coetzee 181).  
This is a questioning of the power of time and also a questioning of her time; it consequently 
emphasises the importance, not of the unfolding of time as Hegel, with his totalising view of 
history, unfolding and dialectical would have it, but of the instant of time or of time’s availability at 
any instant for change.  
 
The unblocking of communication is a key part of Vercueil’s role in Age of Iron. He facilitates the 
posting of the letter which we know reaches the daughter because we are reading it.  He opens up 
channels of dialogue which Mrs Curren uses.  She dialogues with him and to her daughter.  He 
assists her in life and in death.  He opens up to her an experience of his world.  As she says in the 
last hours, days: 
 
The time is nearly upon me when I will have to depend on help for the most intimate things. 
High time, then, to put an end to this sorry story. Not that I doubt Vercueil would help.  
When it comes to last things, I no longer doubt him in any way.  There has always been in 
him a certain hovering if undependable solicitude for me, a solicitude he knows no way of 
expressing.  I have fallen and he has caught me.  It is not he who fell under my care when he 
arrived, I now understand, nor I who fell under his: we fell under each other, and have 
tumbled and risen since then in the flights and swoops of that mutual election.  (Coetzee, 
Age 179) 
 
This passage addresses the mutual reciprocity in their relationship.  It shows her deepening 
acceptance of her need for him and her dependence on him.  A need and dependence that she knows 
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he will unreservedly fulfil.  She describes his child-likeness; his lack of knowledge, which is an 
opening rather than a closure. She says “spare a thought for this man left behind who cannot swim, 
does not yet know how to fly” (Coetzee, Age 181).  Hopefully she teaches him to fly, to leave the 
nest of childhood, before she goes. But we are not told that.  The letter stops, but it does not close.  
There is still that openness, that lack of closure. It leaves a sense of awe and wonderment that 
pervades the last pages, the last hours. 
 
In the passage where she says he has “a solicitude he has no way of expressing” (Coetzee, Age 
179).  I am caught with a thought that Vercueil is immaterial, a real angel. He is someone who cares 
for her, but has no material presence, so that his solicitude, his ethicality, his openness to her, his 
preontological positioning cannot be given material expression.  Later in the novel she expresses his 
lack of knowledge of love.  The agape is there, but there is no experience in the child-man of eros 
which she gives him before she goes. Without going into the history of angelology, angels are 
messengers who have the appearance11 of humans who bring messages to humans from a God or 
the God or, if you will, the God beyond our conception of God.  
 
In Coetzee’s latest novel Diary of a Bad Year, Senior C., as he is sometimes called by his “aria 
secretary” (176) Anya, wonders: 
 
is she the one who has been assigned to conduct me to my death?  If that is so how odd a 
messenger, and how unsuitable! Yet perhaps it is the nature of death that everything about it, 
every last thing should strike us as unsuitable (51). 
He has very early in the novel seen her as “so near to perfect as to be angelic” (8) 
At the end Anya writes to his neighbour Mrs Saunders to find out how he is. She promises herself , 
at the end of his life to: 
 
All that I will promise him, and hold his hand tight and give him a kiss on the brow, a 
proper kiss, just to remind him of what he is leaving behind.  Good night, Senor C, I will 
whisper in his ear: sweet dreams, and flights of angels and all the rest. (Diary 178) 
 
She is confirming the suspicion he had of her as someone sent with a specific role in his life.  There 
are often oblique and pointed references to angels in Coetzee’s work. 
 
11 Angels and the theme of coming to Earth have been explored in Wim Wenders films ‘Wings of Desire’ and ‘Faraway 
so Close’ 
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The co-writer of Darwin’s theory of natural selection, Alfred Russell Wallace, believed that 
evolution involved angels. In contrast, the materialist (Darwin ) saw evolution as being guided by 
blind chance. It is interesting how history buries one view and promotes another (Fox 23). Deborah 
Bird Rose has this to say about Walter Benjamin’s powerful figure of the Angel of History: 
 
Where the Angel of History sees one ongoing catastrophe, and where scholars such as 
Benjamin see an ongoing sequence of catastrophes, apologists for progress would focus on a 
bright and beautiful future (16). 
 
She sides with Benjamin and his angel beating with its wings against the winds of progress with 
catastrophe after catastrophe building up: 
 
His eyes are staring, his mouth is open, his wings are spread. This is how one pictures the 
angel of history.  His face is turned toward the past.  Where we perceive a chain of events, 
he sees one single catastrophe which keeps piling wreckage upon wreckage and hurls it in 
front of his feet.  The angel would like to stay, awaken the dead, and make whole what has 
been smashed.  But a storm is blowing from paradise; it has got caught in his wings with 
such violence that the angel can no longer close them.  This storm irresistibly propels him 
into the future to which his back is turned, while the pile of debris before him grows 
skyward.  This storm is what we call progress. (Benjamin 259) 
 
Bird Rose regards messianicity as recuperating the time of dreaming, so important to the future of 
this country Australia and its people. This is in stark contrast to the year zero of missionary time 
with its inevitable teleological catastrophe. Each position has a different understanding of time. 
Messianicity has time coming from the Other whereas progress sees time objectively. 
 
To read Mr Vercueil in terms of the angelology of a messianic figure, can seem to be a stretching of 
the imagination, pushing the boundaries of possibility, but it is the unknowability of the Other that 
is required to be thought in this.  It is the stretching of these boundaries that is so important as it 
gives a purchase for the existence of the Other whilst still maintaining the boundaries of the alterity 
of the Other. Mrs Curren says:  
I give my life to Vercueil to carry over.  I trust Vercuiel because I do not trust Vercueil.  I 
love him because I do not love him.  Because he is the weak reed I lean upon him. (Coetzee, 
Age 120) 
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Why is she in this quandary? It is probably a combination of factors involving her awareness of her 
own needs, but also an awareness that although her rational mind cannot trust him, there is there 
something Other that can and must be trusted. 
 
Paul Rayment in Slow Man is perplexed in the same way: 
 
But that is the way Gods and Angels seem to be: they choose the most distressingly ordinary 
mortals to consort with. (Coetzee, Slow 190) 
 
He conjectures further along these lines: 
 
Might the whole JokiT affair, with his ill considered and to this point fruitless passion for 
Mrs JokiT at its centre, be nothing in the end but a complicated rite of passage through 
which Elizabeth Costello has been sent to guide him? He had thought Wayne Blight was the 
angel assigned his case; but perhaps they all work together she and Wayne and Drago. 
(Coetzee, Slow 191) 
 
What pains Paul is the simple fact that: “I am not the we of anyone” (193). 
As an immigrant he feels no connection anywhere.  In this lack of connection he embodies the 
individual, the Dasein of Heidegger, whose isolation has only one role – that is to fulfil its Being by 
appropriation.  In his case there is no rupturing of the closure in his life. There is no Other; only 
historical, ontological objects. 
 
The idea of Mr Vercueil as an angel, perhaps the angel of death, come to take Mrs Curren through 
the gates of death fits easily into the mythology of Levinas and Benjamin and Scholem 
(Handelman, Fragments 167 –71). Angels are traditionally regarded as the purveyors of the dead 
beyond the gates.  “Angels clearly transplant the souls of the dead to heaven” (Keck 44). Angels are 
significant in apocalyptic terms.  Mrs Curren is living in what are to her apocalyptic times. 
 
This reading would see Mr Vercueil as an Other; from the future; an arrivant (the one, the guest 
who arrives)12 unknown and unknowable, who is the marginalised and rejected by his own people. 
Mrs Curren is learning to love and, paradoxically, it is the enigmatic Mr Vercueil who shows her 
how by his patience, his presence, his questioning of her endless judgementalism.  She senses that 
 
12 Death is the absolute arrivant, one that has always already arrived. 
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this vagrant will see her through to the end, but also will give her the strength to go beyond death, 
which she is doing with her letter to her daughter and in her attempts to break past the solitariness 
that has been part of her life for so long.  In breaking out of the solitude of the self she liberates 
time. This messianic time opens up for her not only a future but, more importantly it opens 
something she is continuously crying out for: justice. It is the gift of her spirit that must rupture the 
finiteness of this, her world.  Mr Vercuiel’s role is not only to take her spirit beyond but to also 
ensure this same spirit that lies in her story is gifted onto the world to those who read it. For her part 
Mrs Curren gives Vercueil food, echoing in a very real sense what Levinas’s pragmatic ethics calls 
for: “To give, to-be-for-another, out of one’s own mouth, to nourish the hunger of another with 
one’s own fasting” (Levinas, Otherwise 56).  Mrs Curren questions her giving: 
 
Why do I give this man food? For the same reason I would feed his dog (stolen, I am sure) if 
it came begging. For the same reason I gave you my breast.  To be full enough to give and to 
give from one’s fullness: what deeper urge is there? (Coetzee, Age 7). 
 
In “The Novel in Africa” Coetzee, in a lecture, tells the story of a cruise ship with two guest writers 
Elizabeth Costello and Emmanuel Egudu, who are each paid to give a lecture on ‘The Novel’. They 
take quite different positions. Costello suggests it is about the past, and Egudu talks about its place 
in Africa, with the novel’s emphasis on the oral. The voice is a relational device; one that dialogues 
in a story rather than dogmatises in a lecture.  In this case Coetzee does both and problematizes the 
distinction, again illustrating the story as Saying and the lecture as Said.  This is typical of 
Coetzee’s work.  He problematizes genres and categories of art and communication so that 
distinctions become blurred. In their difference emerges a distinct ambivalence – a blurring of 
thought and of genre.  The story is emblematic of Coetzee’s writing, the distinctiveness of which 
lies in its distinct ambivalence and its lack of closure. 
 
The story or lecture can be read as the testimony of Costello’s experience with the power of the 
voice, which Egudu showed her when she was much younger.  In this cruise she revisits that past 
which is now a present, remembering the voice as the spirit within the body and very much part of 
the body. This effaces, or at least questions, the Cartesian dichotomy.  She, with her tradition of the 
mind separated or at least ruling her disembodied body, is perplexed at not only the orality of Egudu 
but also at his embodiment. This transcendence which is not the will to power of Nietzsche or the 
freedom of Heidegger, but the relationality of Levinas challenges her and discomforts her. In its 
orality, Africa dominates Europe reducing it to the Same.  It opens up its otherness as she 
remembers it: 
38
“Show me what an oral poet can do?” 
And he opened her out, spread her, put his lips to her ears, opened them, breathed his breath 
into her, showed her. (Coetzee, The Novel in Africa 19) 
 
This is not a simple reversal of the European domination, but something much more complex. Is 
this embodied voice as it is claimed to be truly Africa reducing Europe to the Same, or can it be 
read as a voice that in its embodiment relates rather than reduces?  The result of this seriature is that 
there is no inside or outside and no dogmatic position of authority; rather there is an ongoing 
fraternity that obviates against closure and towards hospitality to the Other.  In this example 
Coetzee illustrates how the voice, unlike written communication, can be more open to the Other as 
Other. 
 
The centripetal force in language is that which seeks to centralise and unify meaning.  This is the 
force that enables the shared basis for social life to be maintained.  In Levinasian terms it is the 
Said. Alongside this force is the centrifugal force which stratifies ideology into myriad world views.  
This is the Middle Voice that refuses to either totalise or accept totalisation. The heteroglossic novel 
with its capacity for subversion is the Middle Voice because its capacity to subvert or invert 
domination typifies the Saying which is its ethicality coming, as it does, with a desire to be 
responsible for the Other. The Middle Voice is not driven by the desire of, or for, one particular 
minority but rather by one that is for all of humanity. Life & Times of Michael K. parodies The 
Great Trek whose mythical function has historically been to buttress the nationhood of South 
Africa.  This is done by depicting Michael wheeling his mother inland in a home made cart, with 
the enemy exemplified by the institutionalised forces of police and army arrayed against them, 
echoing the wars between Voortrekkers and the Zulus.  This parodic rewriting of a sacred text is 
extended to the concentration camps, which are used to show the abuse the Afrikaaners suffered 
during the war against the British.  Michael inhabits a number of these concentration camps and, 
again, subverts the official history of South Africa and the myths on which it relies (Gallagher 141). 
The ethicality of Coetzee’s parody is a form of Saying, in its attempt to unsay the closure of the 
Other, inherent in nationalist uses of the past and the institutionalised violence of the camps, 
designed to deny the alterity of the Other.  
 
We can also see this ethical challenge to closure with the figure of Paul Rayment in Slow Man
hanging onto his images of the past unaware that they are images freezing time in a way that bodes 
ill for those to come.  In that frozen time there is no space for the Other and no space for the life that 
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is to come.  Paul is the antithesis of a Saying.  His photographs are images that transfix time.  They 
are emblematic of him and the world in which he lives. Time is an abstract notion that is usually 
conceived of as a succession of instants moving towards a given end.  It thus has within it 
connotations of determinism.  To think outside of this and to see time as being nondeterminative 
and as an instant that is related to an entirely unrelated instant that does not follow or succeed it but 
is nevertheless there, is a notion of time that allows the chance event to rupture totality. This 
thought of time is completely ahistorical and aontological and totally outside the mind of Paul 
Rayment.  It is however one that is very much part of Mrs Costello who is separate from the world 
as we generally know it.  She communicates intuitively knowing things about people that defy the 
rational basis of knowledge. Hers is not an objective deterministic world.  When explaining to Paul 
about her source of knowledge she says: 
 
‘She came to me as you came to me,’ says Costello.  A woman of darkness, a woman in 
darkness.  Take up the story of such a one: words in my sleeping ear, spoken by what in the 
old days we would have called an angel calling me out to a wrestling match. (Slow Man
115). 
 
This effect although not made so explicitly applies also to Mrs JokiT as she weaves her way through 
the novel turning up unexpectedly with no rational explanation although her financial 
considerations undermine this argument somewhat.  This is not the case with Mrs Costello who 
seems oblivious to all personal considerations. 
 
Steven Benko very interestingly connects the Saying and Said to technology in the following way: 
 
Recognizing that both technology and humans determine and are determined by culture and 
the discourses that attempt to define what it means to be human, the practical and symbolic 
uses of technology become ways of resisting these discourses. Technology becomes a tool 
for – in some instances chipping away at, in other instances obliterating – more specific and 
specialized discourses about human functioning and meaning and the generic understanding 
of humanity to which they point. In Levinasian terms these discourses are the said, while the 
effort to relativize them or call into question their universality is a saying.  Levinas writes 
that “behind every statement of being as its being, the saying overflows the very being it 
thematises in stating it to the Other.”  Where the saying is the exposure to alterity – exposure 
to the other – the said is a statement, assertion or proposition of which the truth or falsity can 
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be ascertained […]saying breaks through and relativises the said by putting the said into 
question, performing a constant deconstruction of its themes. Eventually, every saying 
congeals into a said, alterity is absorbed into thematisation, and the unsaying must again be 
unsaid in its manner, and there is no stopping; no definitive formulations. (Benko 13)  
 
The continual interruption of the Said by the Saying gives the Said an ethicality. The Saying is the 
ethical priority that prevents the closure of the Said.  Discourse with Levinas is punctuated by these 
knots where the fabric of the text is torn and retied. This ethicality can come in the form of 
testimony or prophecy. Thus Michael K. and Mr Vercueil are prophetic figures. They are the Saying 
in the Said.  The silence of Michael K. and Mr Vercueil is testimony to the irreducible violence of 
the institutional bureaucratic system that these characters continuously unbind.  
 
Whilst the JokiTs and Mrs Costello attempt to rupture the Said of Paul they are also mourning the 
past, that is, the control which is very much central to Paul’s inability to accept a responsibility for 
Illeity, the ungraspable infinite or withdrawn God (Ajzenstat 86). This refusal to accept 
responsibility is something that is effectively denying Paul any possibility of Otherness. That is, of 
being Otherwise than Being.  Paul regards history as an object that contains the Other and thus 
reduces the Other to a totality. This view of time denies the Other justice and as such guarantees the 
present a repeat of the injustice of the past. 
 
The Saying exceeds the boundaries of the contained Said. Whilst still occupying the Said, it is the 
gift that ruptures the strictures, the bindings and is linked firmly to a diachrony that exceeds the 
synchronous.  This diachronous Saying whilst containing the present, the Said, the logos, still points 
firmly and mourns a past and yearns, hopes, cries out to a ‘to come’.  The Saying is thus both 
diachronous and incommensurably prophetic. 
 
Mrs Curren remembers the Piesangs river with its history of the Voortrekkers and a rising 
Nationalism.  It is a place on a journey of a people that stepped apart, apart from, Apartheid. 13 They 
thus had no choice in their journey, but to step apart, and from, and to deny the Other.  Their march 
was not new but one that had in varying ways been going on for thousands of years.  Mrs Curren in 
her small micro-society that mirrors what is outside her home, mourns this apartness, the beliefs 
that generated this apartness, those values innocent in themselves; of decidability, of binaries, a 
belief in the power of the ego, and a denial of the alterity of the other.  The resulting need for 
 
13 This step was rooted in a set of beliefs that encompassed hierarchy and faith without works; that endorsed a rational 
theology and ideology over the irrational God of Abraham. This long step came to fruition with the Reformation and led 
to a Copernican shift in power from the church to secular governance.   
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precision, for certainty, for a community that closes off the other is central to the values of 
excellence and a developed sense of appreciation of the visual, the aesthetic that is inherent in 
Fascism. The wind takes her to the Merchant of Venice where she is reminded by those lines  “Do I 
not bleed like you”(37) of a country that alienates the Other.  She mourns this history that is brought 
to consciousness in the Reformation but which is also central to Western Civilization. She 
epitomises it in herself as a disease made manifest in her body.  She is the dying emblem of a 
cancerous people whose values deny the Other.  She sees nothing good in her world.  She is locked 
in by the bars on her doors and windows. Her link to the world is a television aerial:  
 
Television. Why do I watch it? The parade of politicians every evening:  I have only to see 
the heavy, blank faces so familiar since childhood to feel gloom and nausea. The bullies in 
the last row of school-desks, raw-boned, lumpish boys, grown up now and promoted to rule 
the land.  They with their fathers and mothers their aunts and uncles, their brothers and 
sisters: a locust horde, a plague of black locusts infesting the country munching without 
cease, devouring lives. (Coetzee, Age 25) 
 
Yet in her last days, hours, she struggles with those inherited values, finding herself dependent on 
the very people such as Mr Vercuiel that society has dominated and rejected.  But in this 
dependence there is a change in her values as she attempts to integrate her community, her family, 
in an integration that requires her death and the passing on of her testimony which speaks to a wider 
world and asks for its presence now, not later.  The world closes her family off and refuses them 
hospitality.  It denies responsibility and so the world loses its subjectivity. It ceases to be.  
 
There is in the alterity of the Other an ethical imperative not to subject the Other to the 
appropriation of knowing. To know the Other is to reduce him or her to the Same, and thus to give 
him or her an identity. The notion that Michael K. has no identity is an integral part of his testimony 
or story. In the thought of Levinas, ethical identity is given to me by my responsibility for the 
Other. He refuses the identity that he would have by being reduced to the Same and assimilated into 
the system.  Michael K. searches for a way to accept the call of the Other and to be responsible for 
that Other.  Initially this finds expression in his relationship with his mother.  He finds the problem 
that confronted him at the back of the shed at Huis Norenius, with which the novel begins, and the 
question as to his purpose in life is resolved by accepting responsibility for his mother. His 
transporting her into the Karoo in a barrow, typifies the lengths to which he would go in his 
responsibility for the Other. He later experiments with plants and seeds, finding a bond with the 
earth that eludes the appropriating tendencies so meaningful to a capitalist society, with its 
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propensity for exploitation and destruction. This also involves rejecting the idea of farming with its 
history of environmental degradation, in favour of a movement towards cultivation and gardening 
with its connotations of nurturing.  
 
To have no identity means to exist beyond the ontology of ‘Being’ and to resist the ontology of 
closure; to escape the finite and inhabit the infinite. Michael K. in eluding the being of identity is a 
Saying that eludes the Said.  The Middle Voice is unrealised not only in our language but also in 
our culture which reflects the mastery of the ego in relations which deny the ethical in favour of the 
political.  Coetzee can be read as attempting in all his work to use the Middle Voice to show how 
the Saying and the Said are intertwined.   
 
Michael K. is not given full representation.  We do not know his full name, neither are we given 
very many details about him except that he is physically and socially disadvantaged.  He is 
enigmatic. As the Medical Officer says, he apparently lacks meaning.  Yet in wondering about him 
he engages him in a dialogue, one in which they run away together.  The Medical Officer realises 
that Michael is capable of escaping the institutional world that obliterates people by reducing them 
to faceless nonentities.   
 
Michael is able to survive in the wilderness and is able to find the promised land.  In realising this, 
the Medical Officer imputes to Michael a certain messianicity. The medical office conjectures: 
 
Michaels means something, and the meaning he has is not private to me.  If it were, if the 
origin of this meaning were no more than a lack in myself, a lack, say, of something to 
believe in, since we all know how difficult it is to satisfy a hunger for belief with the vision 
of times to come that the war, to say nothing of the camps, presents us with, if it were a 
mere craving for meaning that sent me to Michaels and his story, if  Michaels himself were 
no more than what he seems to be (what you seem to be), a skin-and-bones man with a 
crumpled lip (pardon me, I name only the obvious), then I would have every justification for 
retiring to the toilets behind the jockeys’ changing-rooms and locking myself into the last 
cubicle and putting a bullet through my head. (Coetzee, Life 165) 
 
I suggest here that the medical officer is searching for a way out of his confinement in a society that 
has no way forward by recognising that Michael K. has meaning but that it is inaccessible to 
institutional appropriation. His understanding of Michael is reflected in the way he pluralises his 
name as ‘Michaels’, suggesting a multiplicity of meanings. 
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I have outlined links between Différance, the Middle Voice and the Saying and the Said.  I have 
argued that our bureaucracy and its attendant rejection of the Other has its source, as predicted by 
Hegel in his dialectic of history, in a secularising rationalism derived from a belief in faith but not 
works. The Life & Times of Michael K. is a stunning testimony to the power of bureaucracy which 
can be; 
 
. . . understood as a structural and organisational expression of the related processes of 
secularization, disenchantment of the world, and rationalization. The secularization process 
involves the liberation of ever wider areas of human activity from religious domination.  
Disenchantment of the world occurs when “there are no mysterious forces that come into 
play but rather that one can, in principle, master all things by calculation” Rationalization 
involves  “the methodological attainment of a definitely given and practical end by means of 
an increasingly precise calculation of adequate means. (Rubenstein 28) 
 
It is this nameless bureaucratic void with which Michael K., Mr Vercueil, Mrs Costello and Mrs 
Curren contend as the Sayings that unbind the unethical determinacy of History with its 
remorseless, crushing, totalising logic and, its relentless closure to the Other. Their Sayings, in their 
messianicity, whilst dealing with the present and mourning the past, also cry out to a future in a 
different order of time, an event to come, different from the present but also one that can come now.  
They not only point to this other future, but show it clearly as one that seeks the Middle Voice, 
neither active or passive, but overflowing both, and thus breaking with the master/ slave paradigm, 
ecologically responsible, seeing in the Other, the Wholly Other and thus open to justice.   In the 
following chapters I will develop these thoughts further, exploring how Testimony is related to the 
Middle Voice and will show the crucial relevance of fecundity in the thought of Levinas and the 
work of Coetzee. 
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CHAPTER 2  
 
TESTIMONY 
 
Black milk of dawn we drink it at dusk 
we drink it at noon and at daybreak we drink it at night 
we drink and we drink 
we are digging a grave in the air there’s room for us all 
A man lives in the house he plays with the serpents he writes  
he writes when it darkens to Germany your golden hair Margarete 
he writes and steps outside and the stars all aglisten he whistles  
for his hounds 
he whistles for his Jews he has them dig a grave in the earth 
he commands us to play for the dance 
 Paul Célan (“Death Fugue” 33) 
 
In this chapter I demonstrate that Levinas’s notion of testimony is important to the reading of ethics 
in the writing of Coetzee. Testimony can be read as exemplified beautifully in Age of Iron, Life & 
Times of Michael K. and Slow Man as well as his autobiographies Boyhood and Youth and a 
lecture “The Novel in Africa.” The figures in these textshave varying degrees of literacy. Michael 
K. cannot, so far as we know, read and is virtually silent, whereas Mrs Curren is literate and can 
speak; Paul presumably is both vocal and literate and yet unable to live in the present.  All, though, 
share a frustrating inability to realise themselves in the world.  The question is whether they are 
reduced by the world to a nonlife, or whether their life is a testimony to a beyond of Being that 
Levinas argues is Infinity?   
 
Testimony is another expression of the Middle Voice in these novels. In the previous chapter I 
argued that the dialogism Bakhtin finds expressed in the works of Dostoevsky is an excellent 
example of the anti-hierarchical Middle Voice.  In what follows I will show how Coetzee’s writings 
attempt to emulate Dostoevsky’s level of spiritual courage in their steadfast refusal to countenance 
the unethical, this being their refusal to appropriate or assimilate the Other. They relentlessly 
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maintain a high level of respect and responsibility to the alterity of the Other, denying the claims of 
totalising politics. 
 
Themes from Coetzee’s two works Boyhood and Youth, ostensibly biographies of the author’s early 
life, are reiterated consistently in his other fictional works. Coetzee’s search to find his own voice 
and his own place is similar to that experienced by many of the characters in his novels. For 
example, the love of the farm that he and his mother have, is echoed in the tragic pilgrimage of 
Michael K. which expresses the complex relationship of a mother and son.  Repeatedly, in 
Boyhood, Coetzee questions the organisation of society from its racial segregation to the ordering 
of family life.  He is never content with the status quo, finding it bewildering and unpleasant.  There 
is no room for him to escape his seemingly inhospitable environment with a mother who slaves 
over him and a father he detests.  From this milieu emerges a boy ostensibly concerned with the 
Other, whatever that might be, and where he sits in this maelstrom he knows not. While the third 
person narration gives the illusion of objectivity it also raises the question, significant in Levinas, of 
Illeity, which lies outside of the thematization of objects.  The third person narration is concerned 
instead with a way of relating to the Other without reducing this Other to the Same.  It is an 
intensely personal way of foregrounding the beyond being of the Other. It brings into the face to 
face the third party, and this is also a way of bringing in the God of Justice (Robbins, Is It 
Righteous To Be 193 –194). 
 
Reading Coetzee’s fiction in terms of Levinasian ethicality, which is indicative of the Middle 
Voice, questions the status quo of human destiny. In this way it echoes Fanon, who in The 
Wretched of the Earth, gives a very cogent ontological analysis of colonialism, exemplary in its 
opposition to the disaster of, and the appalling injustice, of colonialism. Fanon writes of the history 
of European injustice, criticizing the concept of Western civilization and the appalling 
consequences of the war on difference that is a part of our social and intellectual fabric. He says to 
those who would lead the movement of de-colonisation:  
 
Let us waste no time in sterile litanies and nauseating mimicry. Leave this Europe where 
they are never done talking of man, yet murder men everywhere they find them, at the 
corner of every one of their streets, in all the corners of the globe.  For centuries they have 
stifled almost the whole of humanity in the name of a so-called spiritual experience. (Fanon 
251) 
 
46
Here Fanon highlights the problem of marginalised groups with legitimate grievances moving 
forward by engaging in the very activity that once reduced them to the margins. There is thus a 
cyclical revisiting of the exploitation and consequential alienation that is central to the Being of 
beings14. It is by first thinking outside of this ontology that Levinas offers a thought that opens up 
the possibility of a solution. He explicates a way of relating to the Other that removes the 
domination, the hierarchicalism, the exploitation, that exists today. Although history shows that the 
powerful will not generously surrender their power, history also shows that power is never held 
forever. Agamben evolves this concept beautifully in the following way: 
 
In the concept of remnant, the aporia of testimony coincides with the aporia of messianism.  
Just as the remnant of Israel signifies neither the whole people nor a part of the people but, 
rather, the non-coincidence of the whole and the part, and just as messianic time is not 
eternity but rather, the disjunction that divides them, so the remnants of Auschwitz – the 
witnesses – are neither the dead nor the surviving, neither the drowned nor the saved.  They 
are what remains between them. (Agamben 163 –64) 
 
This is suggestive to me of how Levinas sees the Middle Voice of testimony. For Levinas the idea 
of testimony is ethicality par excellence.  Testifying is a prophetic event. It is always pointing 
towards what he calls Infinity.  It is this Infinity within the Other that prevents the assimilation or 
appropriation of the Other. Infinity can also be any nontotalising phenomenon. In positing 
testimony as the witnessing to the alterity of the Other, Levinas means a response and a 
responsibility not to God but to the Infinity in the Other.  This responsibility towards Infinity in the 
Other means that the Other cannot be assimilated and appropriated and that the Other is to be given 
a response that involves exaltation and responsibility.  At the core of witnessing is a relationship 
that is diachronous, and which operates at two different times. Witnessing is grounded in a 
religiousness that is not linked to ontotheology, constructed as it is in the Being of beings, and as 
such complicit in the negation of the otherness of the Other, by reducing the Other to the Same. 
Religion for Levinas is in the relation that is centred in the face to face.  Levinasian witnessing is 
grounded in a relationship to the face of the Other, as that is made manifest, and is a relationship of 
the ego to the destitution inherent in the face of the Other. “The epiphany of the face is wholly 
language” (Levinas, Collected Philosophical Papers 55). In these few words Levinas asserts the 
crucial relational importance of language. It challenges Heidegger, who sees the Being of beings 
 
14 The Being of beings could be seen as analogous to the existence of existents. Being (upper case) is an event of the 
being in the world. The being (lower case) is the Other. 
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rooted in the soil. There is in his thought a source for nationalism with its attachment to land and 
place and a consequent closure on the Other.  
 
Testimony and the experience of those involved in the Holocaust or Shoah, and the many 
concentration camps of the twentieth century, are inextricably linked.  The argument put forward by 
Agamben that the survivors could not witness, that their testimony is flawed, raises the question of 
whether death is needed to achieve testimony.  The opening to the Other is only fully achieved by 
relinquishing the finiteness of the totality that is the self as we know it.  Primo Lévi and Paul Célan 
were just two who were irretrievably damaged by their experiences of the Holocaust and who died 
at their own hands. 
 
Agamben explores the impossibility of testimony by the survivors.  He claims that the true witness 
is the Muselmann who paradoxically cannot bear witness. The Muselmann, as Levi describes him: 
 
is the site of an experiment in which morality and humanity themselves are called into 
question.  The Muselmann is a limit figure of a special kind, in which not only categories 
such as dignity and respect but even the very idea of an ethical limit lose their meaning. 
(Agamben 63) 
 
The Muselmann personifies a nonlife and a nondeath.  The idea of a living corpse who is a 
noncorpse, beyond the concept of both, explores the categories of meaning to which we cannot go 
or should not go: “this should not have happened there to which we cannot reconcile ourselves.  
None of us ever can” (Arendt, Essays 13 –14).  That this did happen, and that time has not enabled 
a reconciliation to this, exemplifies the horror of this breakdown of the distinction between life and 
death. 
 
Bruno Bettelheim in an important work The Empty Fortress argues that there is a distinct link 
between the muselmann or ‘Moslem’, as he calls him, of the concentration camps, and the autistic 
child: 
 
These deteriorated to near autistic behaviour when the feeling of doom penetrated so deep 
that it brought the added conviction of imminent death.  Such men were called “Moslems” 
in the camps and other prisoners avoided them as if in fear of contagion.  The connotation 
was that they had resigned themselves to death unresisting, if this was the will of the SS (or 
of Allah).  To the other prisoners, but also to the SS, this seemed a totally alien, “Eastern” 
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acceptance of death, as opposed to the “normal” one of fighting and scheming to survive [...] 
what was external reality for the prisoner is for the autistic child his inner reality.  Each ends 
up, though for different reasons, with a parallel experience of the world […] having 
transformed his own inner experience to accord with his outer reality he ended up, though 
for entirely different reasons, with a view of himself and the world very similar to that of the 
autistic child. (65–66)  
 
The only way out of this pathological situation was to indulge, according to Bettelheim, in an action 
that improved one’s situation, in however slight a way15.
Life & Times of Michael K. can be understood in the context of these debates over the possibility, 
limits and necessity of testimony, as it is inscribed in a history of the twentieth century that saw an 
estimated 200 million murdered by bureaucratic states. As Derrida argues: “no progress allows us to 
be unaware that never in absolute numbers, never have so many men, women and children been 
enslaved, starved or exterminated on the earth” (Specters 141). Michael K. gives testimony to the 
insidious power of an unnamed faceless bureaucracy whose violence permeates the novel with a 
cold sinister remorseless reduction of the Other to a state of nonlife. The medical officer pleads with 
Michael K. to eat and then realises that he is feeding off different food and asks Michael to forgive 
him as he realises who he is. The genesis of this bureaucracy is a result of a movement sourced in 
the Reformation of a faith without compassion for the Other. Thus an order can be put in place for 
rational objectivity in all affairs. Rubenstein argues that the culture that made the death camps of 
the Nazis possible “was not only indigenous to the West but was an outcome, albeit unforeseen and 
unintended, of its fundamental religious convictions” (Rubenstein 31). Rubenstein questions the 
Hegelian view of history as a totality. There is, likewise, in the literature of Coetzee a prophecy of 
something to come that can come now, an event that shatters any horizons.  This is a prophecy that 
questions the story of history as the unfolding of an event that comes to fulfilment at the end of 
time.  It questions the Hegelian view of history and its master/slave paradigm. Michael McDonald 
discusses Hegel’s phenomenology “as an Odyssey of consciousness that chronicles the adventures 
of Spirit on its way back home” (3).  Time is often seen as a circle. Hegelian time is the time of the 
Said and is, thus, the time of history and of the historiographer. The novel operates in a time that is 
not Hegelian; that is, of the Saying. The circular journey which occurs in ordinary time has an 
economy that denies the Other but which can only be ruptured by the Other.  Odysseus has a 
circular journey home, and his story has a certain closure that can only be ruptured by the advent of 
the Other.  Abraham, in contrast, never returned, and his story as such ruptured the circle of 
 
15 There is psychological research documented on the damage done to detainees in Australian asylum-seeker camps. 
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ordinary time, opening it up to another order of time that comes from the Other when closure is 
ruptured (Auerbach, 3–24). Michael K., like Abraham, ruptures ordinary time with his dream of the 
Other, which is the old man whom he intends taking into the Karoo and showing him how to live.  
In this movement he refuses closure.  He embraces life, and ruptures not only ordinary time but 
Hegelian Idealism developed “on an Odyssean narrative of reason that consummates the whole 
‘spiritual adventure’ of Western philosophy” (4). Breaking with “the Odyssey of Hegelian reason 
reveals the extent to which speculative idealism remains economic, circles back to the home, to the 
proper, and to property”(5). Michael, though, circles back to a non-home. There is no dwelling or 
rootedness in place or country for Michael. Michael mirrors Paul Rayment and Mrs Curren who 
both find themselves exiled. They challenge the ethic of closure of Heidegger in their exile from the 
Being of beings 
 
Mrs Curren, in her dying hours and days, witnesses, not only to the dying society around her as the 
State paroxysms in its death throes, but also to the Others around her.  She refuses to deny their 
Otherness.  Her actions cut through class, gender and racial boundaries. Her actions refuse to 
embrace the tyranny of hierarchy, and she does not support the State apparatus as it seeks to impose 
its denial of the Other.  We are starkly reminded of this, with the death of the housekeeper’s son and 
his friend, both cut down by bullets in different locations during the war on Apartheid.  She cuts 
through the racial divide, refusing to recognise that category of the Being of beings, which seek to 
hierarchicalize people according to some arbitrarily imposed notion of colour.  
 
In Mrs Curren’s trip to the black township, where rioting was taking place and she was attempting 
to protect the son and friend of her housekeeper, Mrs Curren testifies very clearly who she is 
writing to “To whom this writing then? The answer: to you but not to you; to me; to you in me” 
(Coetzee, Age 5). The you in me is the wholly Other, that is Infinity.  She is simply testifying to and 
about Infinity.  She is mourning her past, the past of her people and is calling to Infinity for justice.  
Her revulsion for the totalitarianism of the State is eloquently expressed: 
 
“The disgrace of the life one lives under them: to open a newspaper, to switch on the 
television, like kneeling and being urinated on.  Under them: under their meaty bellies, their 
full bladders.  ‘Your days are numbered,’ I used to whisper once upon a time, to them who 
will now outlast me.” (Coetzee, Age 9) 
 
She is not a survivor, she too witnesses to the Muselmann, the living dead and is able to testify in 
ways that Agamben and Levi claim the survivors could not witness. 
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Agamben describes the camps as a going to that beyond the human; it is the death beyond death 
which is the peculiar horror of the camps. Not only did the prisoners die, but so also did their 
children and therefore there are no future generations. In the novel Disgrace, the academic David 
Lurie is penalised for being involved with his student and moves in with his daughter who is raped 
in his presence by locals who shoot her dogs.  David L. Cark and Deborah Bird Rose in a 
conference on Levinas in Brisbane on 30 June 2006 spoke meaningfully about the human animal 
interface.  In another unpublished paper, Rose, noting Graham Harvey’s “the world is full of 
persons, only some of whom are human,” (6) refers to an informant Tim Yilnagarri, who tells how 
we are all descended from dogs: 
 
In this story Dingo Dreamings are the ancestors of all human beings.  At first there was only 
one creature – a dog – human – person, and this creature differentiated himself/herself, 
inaugurating both dog – persons and human persons. (9) 
 
Tim Yinagarri’s testimony in Dingo Dreaming is a testimony of hope, in the possibility of a 
response to an ethics that is beyond ethics. Hope is not in a response in some far distant time, but a 
time that is now. This can be read in Disgrace, where David Lurie sleeps with a dog in the kennel 
and forms strong bonds with the dogs he destroys. It is as if they replace or are the human in his 
world. The shooting of the dogs in Disgrace also is destruction of future generations of persons. It is 
not just the death of the dogs as it is not just the death of the people in the camps but it is the death 
of future generations that is particularly disturbing. Coetzee, in questioning the animal human 
divide, is again witnessing to Illeity. 
 
It is to this that the Muselmann bears witness.  The survivor does not.  Michael K., in his silence, 
bears witness to the Muselmann. His negation of communication is emblematic of this beyond the 
human, beyond death.  The doctor entreats him to speak, to act, and to eat.  Michael K’s rejection of 
life is paradoxically a rejection of the beyond death, which is enshrined when rationalism is taken to 
its limits and personified by a thought that embraces faith without works;  a thought that endorses 
without waver, a belief in excellence and beauty, and an overwhelming endorsement of hierarchy.  
It is a trenchant rejection of the fascism that resides in a rationalist ethic. As Primo Levi says when 
being interviewed by Dr Pannwitz in If This Were a Man:
because that look was not one between two men: and if I had known how completely to 
explain the nature of that look, which came as if across the glass window of an aquarium 
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between two beings who live in different worlds, I would also have explained the essence of 
that great insanity of the third Germany. (111–112) 
 
The overwhelming hierarchical nature of the exchange precludes any notion of ethicality in this 
relationship. 
 
Lèvi goes on to say that: 
 
the brain which governed those blue eyes and those manicured hands said: ‘this something 
in front of me belongs to a species which it is obviously opportune to suppress.  In this 
particular case, one has to first make sure that it does not contain some utilizable element.’ 
(Lèvi 112)  
 
The thinking that epitomises Lèvi’s Dr Pannwitz is a thought that is sourced in a Darwinian and 
Nietzschean16 racial hierarchicalism, a theology of the reformation which supports faith without 
works and thus denies any humanity to the Other and a rationalism that denies the Other altogether.  
In all, it is a denial of difference and a logic that demands extinction of difference to enhance 
closure and totality, and is one that demands function and utility from all. The world that Lévi 
documents in the camps was writ large in Apartheid South Africa and still is in various ways and 
places in the world. Human history shows our deep propensity for closure on the Other. Primo Levi 
in a collection of  literary pieces he regards as distinctly valuable, has a piece on war that suggests 
we are not alone in the universe: “He shuddered at the sound and sight of the alien lying there.  One 
ought to be able to get used to them after a while, but he’d never been able to.  Such repulsive 
creatures they were, with only two arms and two legs, ghastly white skins and no scales” (Lèvi, 
Search 173).The alien in this story was of course a human being, hunted by someone from another 
planet. 
 
In reading Coetzee there lies a possibility of reading what is required to transcend this closure, this 
totality, which is central to the Shoah and Western civilization. It is extremely important to see in 
this denial of the Other, the possibility and the impossibility of an opening to justice.  This is 
exactly what can be read in Coetzee, where the alterity of the Other is testified to in many ways.  
The medical doctor in Life & Times of Michael K. implores Michael K., to eat, to live.  This is not 
for any utilizable reason, rather it is simply an invitation to live. Michael K. though is living on a 
 
16 “Slavery must not be abolished; it is necessity. We only need to see to it that the men emerge for whom one will 
work.” (The Will To Power, 4) 
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different plane. His food is not of this world, as the doctor comes to realize “You did not want to 
die, but you were dying. You were like a bunny-rabbit sewn up in the carcase of an ox, suffocating 
no doubt, but starving too, amid all those basketfuls of meat, for the true food” (Coetzee, Life 164). 
 
Michael K. is living a life beyond the life of Being. The doctor in Levinasian terms, testifies to 
Infinity, in the transcendence of Michael K., which is exemplified when he testifies to alterity in 
transporting his mother inland in a homemade barrow, which can be read as showing a respect and a 
responsibility to the alterity of the Other.  This responsibility is lived out in time and space.  His 
mother, rejected by society, is exalted by Michael K., in what can be read as a matchless exercise in 
devotion: 
 
The box of ashes waited in a corner of the living room.  He hoped that his mother, who was 
in some sense in the box and in some sense not, being released, a spirit released into the air, 
was more at peace now that she was nearer her natal earth. (Coetzee, Life 57) 
 
He returns her ashes to the earth on the farm “turning the earth over spadeful by spadeful” (Coetzee, 
Life 59). In this act he begins his life as a cultivator. This giving to the Other exceeds the bounds of 
the rational, rupturing the confines of a utilitarian ethics.  It exceeds any exchange value and is thus 
of the order of the gift (Derrida, The Gift of Death 47).  
 
Mrs Curren testifies to a world in the throes of change, to children in an Age of Iron at the vanguard 
of a revolution.  She testifies to what is happening around her, and confesses to her impotence, to 
assemble a semblance of order in what she perceives as chaos.  What she does is to reach out to the 
Other, in the form of the marginalised and itinerant Mr Vercueil, who becomes her companion, 
advisor, support and confidant.  Her actions testify to the alterity of Mr Vercueil who is unknown to 
anyone and stubbornly remains so. As a Muselmann in the sense of the walking dead, Mrs Curren is 
a true witness, in the sense of the witness, as one who testifies to Infinity.   
 
Here we have a notion of a Middle Voice as one that is located between the impossibility of 
witnessing completely to the truth, or to Infinity, and to the impossibility of the messianic, which is 
a call to a justice that can come now.  This abyss, this yawning chasm where there is no binary 
opposition to which to cling to, no possibility of action or being acted on but is, rather, an 
overflowing of the present into the past and into the future, is indicative of the Middle Voice. 
Robbins in Altered Reading reminds us that Levinas’s thought can move from the face to the voice. 
Levinas regards seeing a face as the same as hearing a voice.  The murderousness of the gaze with 
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its overwhelming propensity for violence is eased by the idea of the voice with its capacity for 
relation inherent in the Middle Voice. More specifically, when Levinas gives “the face as voice, as 
he repeatedly does, he in a sense defaces it, gives it as non phenomenal figure” (Robbins, Altered
66).  Blanchot in The Infinite Conversation further supports the notion of the face as voice, in 
reminding us that the French word for conversation (entretien) is intransitive as it hangs 
precariously over an abyss (75 –76). In this idea of a conversation as a hanging between two 
extremes we have an evocative image of the Middle Voice:  an ethical voice engaged in an infinite 
conversation that is not owning or owned but infinitely engaged in relating rather than possessing.  
The face as voice achieves another important point as it eludes the violence of the face’s 
connotations of gaze or vision and its indisputable propensity to kill.  The gaze inhabits an economy 
of possession.  It is, as Levinas says, “by essence murderous” (Levinas, Totality & Infinity 47). 
 
Agamben believes: 
 
If the survivor bears witness not to the gas chamber or to Auschwitz but to the Muselmann, 
if he speaks only on the basis of an impossibility of speaking, then his testimony cannot be 
denied.  Auschwitz – that to which it is not possible to bear witness – is absolutely and 
irrefutably proven. (Agamben 164) 
 
Agamben goes onto elucidate what this can mean: 
 
that the phrases “I bear witness for the Muselmann” and “the Muselmann is the whole 
witness” are not constative judgements, illocutive acts, or enunciations in Foucault’s sense.  
Rather; they articulate a possibility of speech solely through an impossibility and, in this 
way, make the taking place of a language as the event of a subjectivity. (164) 
 
This raises the question of speech and who is speaking and not speaking.  Is Michael K. the perfect 
witness, the Muselmann, the living dead? Is his refusal to speak testimony of his living death?  Is 
his refusal to speak a choice or the mark of an impossibility of speech?  Is the impossibility of 
Michael’s speech indicative of the impossibility of testifying to Infinity?  Is this impossibility of 
speaking, testifying to Infinity, the same impossibility of the Messianic, which is the incoming 
event of the wholly other, of Infinity?  Mrs Curren and Michael K., with their testimony as 
Muselmann, witness to the impossibility of life, in fact transcend death with their testimony, with 
the messianicity of their word. The link between messianicity and witnessing is in time. That is the 
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time of the Other as Levinas puts it. The physical survival of the “survivor” in the camps depended 
crucially on a renunciation of their humanity. There was no room for the Other. It is this 
renunciation of humanity, whether voluntary or forced, or as a combination of both, that the 
“survivor” cannot accept. In Michael K.’s case, the institutional life central to society as we know it, 
with its belief in individualism, and its anonymous servants of the state, maintaining the inhumanity 
of the Other, is something he transcends.  
 
The pathological state of institutional life denies the existence of the Other and reduces beings to 
Being.  It is in overcoming this reduction to Being and in some way maintaining the flickering of 
humanity over and above the level of survival that is central to witnessing to Infinity.  For Michael 
K., the return to the farm in the Karoo and the growing of vegetables and melons is this ethical 
reaching out to the Other that in fact constitutes Michael as a self.  He is held hostage by the seeds 
and by the earth that brings the seeds to life, at the very limits of survival. At the genesis of 
Muselmannhood there is still the Other, and this witnessing to that Other, at the limits of existence, 
is witnessing par excellence. It is in this awareness of the impossible that there comes faith and 
therefore hope. This exaltation of the Other exhibits respect and responsibility and avoids reducing 
the Other to the orbit of the Same.  Whilst accepting the Being of beings, that is, a need for food and 
shelter and other materials necessary for survival, Michael K. rises above this orbit testifying to 
Infinity in all its activities, thus avoiding the domination and exploitation so central to the wisdom 
and practices of Western civilization. On the farm he gives himself up to time. This is not ordinary 
standardised time but the time of the Other: 
 
…as summer slanted to an end, he was learning to love idleness [. . .] But as a yielding up of 
himself to time, to a time flowing like oil from horizon to horizon [. . .] Once or twice the 
other time in which the war had its existence reminded itself to him as the jet fighters 
whistled high overhead. But for the rest he was living beyond the reach of calendar and 
clock in a blessedly neglected corner, half awake, half asleep. (Coetzee, Life 116) 
 
The Other brings its own future different from the future of the self, whilst diachronously opening 
up to a messianic future which is a call to responsibility in the face of the other.  As Hutchens puts 
it:  “The time of the other person is the ‘other’ of the time of the self” (71). 
 
Derrida in The Gift of Death develops an idea of gift which ruptures the closure made by a 
Heideggerian notion of death. Testimony or witnessing to the trace of the withdrawn God or Illeity 
is measured by my response to the Other.  It is giving to the Other in the order of the Gift that 
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ruptures the economy of exchange that is the guiding light of our civilization.  In this rupturing of 
exchange there is an inherent diachrony.  Costello and the JokiTs' response to Paul is marked by this 
gift: “‘Magnificent,’ he repeats. ‘A magnificent gift.’ [. . .] Much more than I deserve” (254). The 
gift ruptures the exchange.  The JokiTs occupy a diachronous position to Paul, who denies the 
Other, the trace of Infinity in himself, in a world that is objective, concise, confined and with a 
definable reality – captured in images that exist in synchronisable time.  There is an eternal present 
that denies the diachrony of the Other.  The two different times that inhabit the worlds of Elizabeth 
Costello and Paul Rayment are evident throughout the text of Slow Man. Elizabeth operates 
intuitively:   
 
‘You may not see the point of it, Mr Rayment, the pursuit of intuitions, but this is what I do.  
This is how I have built my life: by following up intuitions, including those I cannot at first 
make sense of.  Above all those I cannot at first make sense.’ (85) 
 
Elizabeth Costello operates outside the bounds of objective rational reality in a different time.  This 
diachrony between their positions is testimony to the trace of Illeity. Paul’s response is simply one 
of bewilderment: “Following up intuitions: what does that mean, in the concrete? How can she have 
intuitions about a complete stranger, someone she has never laid eyes on?” (85). Paul is exasperated 
by her alterity. He has no respect for her and affects no responsibility for her.  He cannot do 
anything with her, or, it seems, without her. He lives in a past present.  She is distinctly messianic; 
in the now and yet always to come. His time is a linear progressive time; one that is determinable. 
As Paul says to himself: “The answer is simple: the red and the blue and the green will never return 
because of entropy, which is irreversible and irrevocable and rules the universe” (119). Paul lives in 
a closed deterministic world that is teleologically sound and direct. This markedly contrasts with 
Elizabeth, who operates with a time that is a time of instants where each instant is new and 
unconditioned by the previous instant. This is messianic time. Exposed to the Costello worldview 
Paul crumbles under the ambiguity, the uncertainty. He has no idea who Marianna, the woman 
procured for him by Mrs Costello, is. He does not know whether he is being set up.  His position of 
a definable certainty is antithetical to the world Elizabeth presents. The diachrony is marked to the 
extent that he feels his sanity is threatened. 
 
Or is it worse than that, incomparably worse, so much worse that the mind threatens to 
buckle? Is this what it is like to be translated to what at present he can only call the other 
side? Is that what has happened to him; is that what happens to everyone? (122) 
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Paul’s refusal to conform to the script that Elizabeth may be writing, to step outside the role he has 
imagined for himself into a role beyond Being, exhibits the limits of his world, governed as it is by 
an ontotheological humanism. Escaping this reduction is a challenge that can be read in many of 
Coetzee’s works. Marais in “The Hermeneutics of Empire” says: “All of Coetzee’s works thematize 
this escape.  Indeed in the case of  Life & Times of Michael K., the very structure of the novel is 
informed by a recurring pattern of linguistic appropriation followed by escape” (Marais 7). What 
Marais does not address is exactly what Michael K. is escaping from. Levinas, in a very early work, 
On Escape, talks meaningfully about this: “The need for escape or evasion leads us into the heart of 
philosophy.  It allows us to renew the ancient problem of being qua being” (7). Levinas writes of 
the need to escape being. In “Reflections on Hitlerism,” Levinas shows where the ‘il y a’ leads 
which is not only a denial of the Other but a determined rational destruction of that Other.  Escape, 
though, for Levinas, is to undo the link between existents and existence.  It is this link that Coetzee 
explores in his work.  Mrs Curren and Vercueil live, as Michael K. and the other characters in 
Coetzee’s works, on the edge of existence.  Michael K. symbolises the beyond of being, giving 
nonentity a distinctive persona that rejoices in escape. Escape, is for Levinas, “to break that most 
radical and unalterably binding of chains, the fact that the I [moi] is oneself [soi–même]” (On 
Escape 9). 
 
Idealism, where all ethics is reduced to politics17, is a deceptive escape from Being, one that 
ultimately leads to a false illusion “at the very moment when idealism imagines it has surpassed 
being it is invaded by being from all sides” (Levinas, On Escape 40).  Escape is achieved by 
recognising Illeity in the Other and thus achieving a denial of the individual as subject and a 
consequent refutation of the bourgeois spirit of capitalism.  
 
Unlike Odysseus, who returns home after his journey, Michael K., in exile, ruptures an economy of 
closure, knowing Being is only the mark of our civilization not the ground of it, and effortlessly 
transcends it, dreaming of his return to the Karoo with an Other whom he can show how to live. As 
Sayings that escape the presence of Being, these figures in Coetzee’s novels bear testimony to the 
Infinity that is a transcendence beyond Being. Michael could be construed as being a Saying; that is, 
a source of ambiguity, ahistorical, aontological, and open to the Other, Paul Rayment in Slow Man,
is very much the Said. He is a solitary, closed, historical being that refuses any responsibility for the 
world other than in terms of appropriation. This pathology that attempts to own the world and 
refuses in its solitary pride any place in it for the Other, is very much the status quo in Western 
society. Paul’s first attempt at sex since his accident is a carefully stage-managed affair requiring 
 
17 See Oona Ajzenstat p. 341 for comment on this. 
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him to be blind.  In fact this is his normal state; seemingly even in contact with the Other, he cannot 
see them as an Other. The JokiT family, whose name puns with joke, are seemingly intent, with the 
best of motives, in rupturing the staid seriousness of Paul’s closed, pretentious world.  The joke in 
Coetzee’s novel is undoubtedly on Paul and those who enthuse about a wonderful heritage built on 
a closure to anything that endorses the Other. 
 
The representations of Michael K. and of Mr Vercueil both allude to the unknowability of Infinity, 
and they oscillate in their own way between the concreteness of the Said and the unknowability, the 
ambiguity, the transcendence of a Saying.  There is this movement, this seriature throughout the text 
that embraces Infinity. Mr Vercueil, who Mrs Curren takes to her bed, is both a concrete, separate 
identity if he could be called that, and at the very same moment he is the infinity within her.18 The 
ambivalence of his place in her life is marked throughout by a definite strength that she increasingly 
comes to lean on as she grows weaker in her last days.  The reductionism of the Other to the Same 
is immortalised especially in the works of Kafka. What Blanchot has to say about Kafka, he could 
equally have said about Michael K., as Coetzee was inspired by The Castle:
It is strange that K. should have been considered by so many commentators bound for 
madness at the end of The Castle. From the start he is outside of the opposition reason – 
madness, for everything he does is without any relation whatever to the reasonable, and yet 
absolutely necessary: that is to say, correct, or justified.  Likewise, it does not seem possible 
that he should die (either damned or saved – this is of little importance). For one thing, it 
isn’t living and dying that are at stake in his combat.  But then too, he is too tired (his 
fatigue is indeed the one trait which is accentuated as the narrative unfolds) – too tired to 
die. Too tired for the coming of his death not to change into an interminable nonarrival. 
(Blanchot 141) 
 
Levinas is positioned against Hegelianism in its monism where everything is subsumed under a 
historical plan.  Totalitarianism and liberalism are but ways of putting this plan into action.  They 
reduce difference to the Same, seeing difference as giving rise to antagonism, whereas Levinas 
regards respect for difference as the path to ethics  (Ajzenstat 8). 
 
Merivale notes in “Coetzee’s Kafka” the animal similes for Michael K. (163).  In recounting the 
Story of Bobby in Difficult Freedom, Levinas asserts how animals can give humans a humanity. 
 
18 There are some very interesting gender questions raised here in terms of the white woman being sexually subjected to 
the coloured man or vice versa and how this relates to an ethics that goes beyond ethics or rather one that escapes the 
politics of power. 
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Bobby was a stray dog who welcomed the inmates of the camp home each night from work.  Bobby 
was the only one in the camp who recognised them as human. He represents in this welcome, a 
witnessing to Illeity or the withdrawn God, who in his welcome to the face of the Other we 
recognise as an ethics beyond ethics.  Levinas recognises the incongruity of this as:  
 
other men who had dealings with us or gave us work or orders or even  
a smile –and the children and women who passed by and sometimes raised their eyes – 
stripped us of our human skin. We were subhuman, a gang of apes.  [ . . . ] we called him 
Bobby, an exotic name, as one does with a cherished dog. For him, there was no doubt that 
we were men. (Levinas, Difficult Freedom 153) 
 
Michael K. is beyond any binary, any closure, any identity, any category any representation and he 
relentlessly eludes meaning thus giving him a sense of messianicity. Blanchot’s discussion of K. 
also addresses Jewish messianicity and how it relates to an event in its occurrence or non-
occurrence. Blanchot’s conception of the Messiah distinguishes it from the God-man of 
Christianity.  Blanchot sees the Messiah as the just man, which we are all called to be:  
 
The Messiah – quite the opposite in this respect from the Christian hypothesis – is by no 
means divine.  He is a comforter, the most just of the just, but it is not even sure that he is a 
person – that he is someone in particular.  When one commentator says, The Messiah is 
perhaps I, he is not exalting himself. (Blanchot 142) 
 
To be a messiah requires certain conditions. These are not all specified, but I would suggest that 
they require a stepping beyond the confines of the Said.  A rupturing of its closure and an embrace 
of a temporality that is diachronous,19 that in language and in time embraces the Middle Voice 
which equitably embraces and overflows both subject and object. A fundamental tenet of Levinas’s 
thought, as exemplified in The Time of the Other, is that time is constituted by the Other in the face 
to face. This constituting of time is diachronous because both operate at two different times. This 
way of seeing time has many implications, one of which is that the Other is never fully present in 
time or in space. Thus the alterity of the Other is protected.  This implies that the Other cannot be 
fully represented in time or space and is thus unknowable.  It is fundamental to the ethics of 
Levinas.   
 
19 In Existence and Existents (xxv), Levinas introduces a conception of time where the future is for all of one’s time that 
is; there is a strong component of hope for the future linked to what one is and also what one has been.  It has a distinct 
retroactivity over the past and present due to a conception of time where one is renewed at each instant. Not just the 
future but all of one’s self is renewed. 
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The outside is largely prosthetic and as such can be seen as cultural rather than natural.  The 
question is whether matter is the prosthetic for humans or whether humans are the prosthetic for 
matter (Grosz 152).  The question is whether matter is active in transforming us when it is actually 
doing so.  Is, therefore, Paul’s rejection of prosthetics a rejection of becoming a tool of matter; a 
victim of inert forces shaping mankind?  It is, of course, startling to see ourselves as being 
manipulated by supposedly inert, unintelligent matter. Paul of course is also stuck between matter 
and the enigmatic Mrs Costello, another agent of change. The unfree human is afraid to live, to fly. 
He is conquered by a fear of the diachrony of time, wanting to maintain control of all events, 
refusing to rupture the present with any uncertain future. His fear of diachrony is a fear of the 
unknowable in that the Other is unknowable. The trace of Illeity “is not and never was there 
spatially or temporally.  For it is the trace of something that was not a being” (Ajzenstat 88). Paul 
endlessly wonders about himself:  
 
Does it say something about him, that native preference for black and white and shades of 
grey, that lack of interest in the new? Is that what women missed in him, his wife in 
particular: colour, openness? (Coetzee, Slow Man 65) 
 
Is this preference for black and white and shades of grey, anything but a rejection of life in 
technicolour?  So much so that Paul resolutely holds onto his images of the past that freeze time and 
maintain an historical fiction. Susan Gallagher reminds us that history “is a mythic discourse 
deployed by the ruling elite to maintain the status quo; that is injustice and oppression.” (Gallagher 
35)   
 
The JokiTs,' unafraid of history and relentlessly open to the Other, are aware of the chaos of history 
building up behind them. As Marijana says to Paul: 
 
‘In Europe people say Australia have no history because in Australia everybody is new. 
Don’t mind if you come with this history or that history, in Australia you start zero.  Zero 
history, you understand? (Coetzee, Slow Man 49)  
 
Rose’s critique of palindromic time is central to understanding the significance of Marijana’s 
remark. Rose argues that the palindromic or zero notion of time is from the Christian calendar and 
is replicated in colonising methodology:  
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The term year zero comes from the Christian calendar; we are familiar with the 
characterisation of our time-constructs as linear, so it is important to examine the specific 
structure of this calendar. In fact its structure is palindromic and thus involves linearity and 
mirroring.  A verbal palindrome can be read from left to right–MADAM IM ADAM–or 
from right to left without loss of meaning. The letter ‘I’ in this palindrome is the central 
point, and moving out from the centre there is an identical structure in each direction. 
In the Christian calendar, moving forward and backward from the notional Year Zero, each 
side is the numerical counterpart to the other.  This structure is also an ancient and persistent 
narrative structure. (59) 
 
It thus involves linearity and mirroring so that there is a pattern to history which moves from a 
proto-situation, through a crisis, to a fulfilment. Marijana can be read as reminding Paul that, 
contrary to European’s colonial views, Australia does have a history. The zero construction of time 
is one that drives most of the Western world’s world view and is one that is inherently violent, as 
James Hatley tells us: 
 
Levinas equates this totalising/silencing/assimilating project with warfare: ‘one sees the 
other as a mode of resistance to one’s own ideas about her or him, ideas the other must be 
pressed to embrace.’ (180) 
 
The result of this is a reduction of the Other to the Same. This is something that Paul is attempting 
with Marijana and her family, which Mrs Costello attempts to circumvent. Paul later wonders if: 
“the history that he wants to claim as his is not just finally an affair for the English and the Irish, 
foreigners keep out?” (Coetzee, Slow Man 52).  Paul is significantly out of place.  Although he is 
white he is unable to claim a sense of belonging, let alone possession.  His alienation, he imagines, 
is due to nationhood. His mother is French. He is in a land that is colonised under the fiction of 
Terra Nullius. His prize photo is of a group of women and children experiencing extreme poverty. 
Moreton-Robinson quite rightly argues that   “Indigenous people’s sense of home and place are 
configured differently to migrants’,” (35).  But Coetzee, I believe, makes the point, that migrants, 
wherever they come from, settle uneasily into Australia or any country for that matter.  The 
acceptance of the Other is not based on anything other than assimilation. The concept of hospitality 
which is absolutely central to Levinas and developed further by Derrida, is, it seems to me, 
abhorrent to Western society. It is important to appreciate exactly what Levinas means by being 
Hospitable. As Colin Davis argues in a reading of Albert Camus’s The Stranger:
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The extreme nature of Levinasian responsibility, and its difference from weak versions of 
respect for otherness, becomes clear in the violent nature in which Levinas formulates his 
ethics; [….].This form of responsibility is nothing like philanthropic altruism.  It allows of 
no calculation of costs or benefits, no happy resolution and no easy conscience [….].  The 
demand made by Levinasian ethics can never be fully met, because more will always be 
asked of us.  Such an ethics, in sum, requires that we take responsibility for the Other in the 
full knowledge that doing so may cause us harm. (251) 
 
This is something that Coetzee questions in all his novels; that is, our position with respect to the 
otherness of the Other. It is something that goes on beyond our death. 
 
In this chapter I have shown how I have exemplified the idea of Testimony in Levinasian ethicality. 
In my view, this notion of the Middle Voice is, as I suggested in a previous chapter, not only central 
to the Saying and, consequently, to Levinasian ethicality, but is also central to the notion of 
testimony in its linkages to the ethics beyond ethics and to the messianicity inherent in this. This 
messianicity in Levinasian testimony is a call to justice. In the next chapter I will develop further 
the idea of diachrony and anachrony that underlies fecundity and which is pervasive in Levinasian 
thought and in Coetzee’s work. 
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CHAPTER 3 
FECUNDITY  
 
Once 
I heard him, 
He was washing the world, 
Unseen, nightlong, 
Real. 
 Paul Célan (88) 
 
In this chapter, I show how fecundity in my reading of Levinas, is a healing of the past by the 
children of tomorrow and involves an opening to the future that is central to the coming of justice. 
Justice through fecundity in this sense comes with the arrival of an event that shatters the horizons 
of the present. 
This event is the arrival of the Other that constitutes the self and accepts the respect and 
responsibility given as its due.  Here lies the core of justice in this world.  The event opens to an 
ethics that is beyond ethics as conceived by Kant with his categorical imperative, with its rules and 
laws so beloved of a rational world, instanced as it is by a thought that is locked into the 
maintenance of the Self and not the Other.  It is a thought that regards the reduction of the Other to 
the Same as the central logic governing society.  Marxism, before its reduction to State control by 
Stalin, was a thought materially concerned with the wellbeing of the Other. However this thought 
was occluded by a Hegelian logic that makes the Other part of a system in a time frame that is 
linked to the notion of progress and, as such, is teleological and precludes the bringing of justice 
now.   
 
There is also in Marxism, as Derrida so eloquently reminds us, a certain Spirit of Marx that cannot 
be denied.  How does this Spirit of Marx shape the relationship between time and the Other?  
Derrida argues that this Spirit of Marx is concerned with, and for justice (Specters 85).  Justice is 
conceived here in terms of messianicity; that is where time occupies a dimension outside of 
ordinary time and is one that is uniquely centred on the arrival of the Other as event that shatters the 
horizons of expectation.  John D. Caputo goes to some lengths in The Prayers & Tears of Jacques 
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Derrida to elaborate Derrida’s thought on messianicity so that it is not confused with the 
messianism locked in the thought of a determinate God which is one that is knowable. This would 
mean reducing God to the Same which is what ontotheology does. Time as a part of the phenomenal 
world is of immense significance in the life of  humans, particularly as significant possibilities for 
life and for justice are denied with conceptions of time that are locked into either clock, 
psychological or linear scales. Levinas has a conception of diachronic time that flows from a 
relationship with the Other and opens up the possibility of justice and consequently of life. 
Diachronic time is concerned with the notion of the self and the Other which constitutes time. The 
Other and self operating at two different times have in fact two different world views and, as such, 
are in perpetual alterity.  Their noncognizance of each other speaks volubly of the respect and 
responsibility that inheres in diachrony with its refusal to appropriate the Other. 
 
Anachrony is concerned with not only diachronic time, that is the time concerned with the alterity 
of the Other, but also with the time of the past and the future.  It is involved with mourning the past 
and looking to the future.  In an awareness of the diachronous we perceive two incommensurable 
aspects of time due to the Others’ immemorial past and a future that is devoid of any predictability 
or determinability. Deborah Bird Rose reminds us that anachronic time correlates with that of the 
Dreaming where the time of the ancestors is also now and to come. 
 
According to Hutchens: “The temporality of the other person, the unpredictability of the futural 
generation and the immemorability of the experiences of the dead open up what Levinas calls 
‘anachrony’, the time that has no principle or origin.”(72). This is a profound understanding of time 
and the Other that brings to the forefront of our consciousness an awareness of the fragmentation of 
time and of the Other.  So much so, that we can say “anachrony is the fragmented temporality of 
infinite responsibility.  There is no synchronic principle by which the self could master time 
because it experiences many divergent facets of time in its relationships with the other person” 
(Hutchens 72).  Hutchens elucidates anachrony further in saying that it “is the self’s real experience 
of time and we thus exclude the possibility of what is known as objective time which is the self’s 
effort to impose its own time on all time and thus reduce the other to the same” (Hutchens 74). 
 
In anachrony, the self experiences many divergent experiences of time in its  
multi-faceted relations with the Other.  In this experience which is a “fragmented temporality of 
infinite responsibility”(72), there is no one site where time can be centred, mastered or 
synchronised.  Historically this is significant because it means there is a certain arrogance in 
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thematic rationality. It is as if there is only one view of the world. This often shows up particularly 
in the writing of history: 
 
what historical memory cannot recuperate and assemble is the significance of the events as 
experienced by those who experienced them, which is profoundly lost to posterity. 
(Hutchens 73) 
 
Mrs Curren, rupturing the hegemony of the present, gives her view, her experience of history: it is 
not something delved into from the past but sent from the past as a lived experience, recuperated 
and made real. Anachrony questions the very notion of the ‘present’, challenging its veracity.  
Within the present there is literally a smorgasbord of presents, an infinity of recuperable times past 
and future with memories and expectations.  The self has no control over the fictitious concept of 
the present. Anachronous time threatens, disembowels and ruptures the notion of control one thinks 
one has over fictitious time.  Humans in a futile attempt to reduce the Other to the Same objectify 
time, that is they impose the self’s time on all time, which is to make time an object, whereas 
anachronous time which is the time of lived experience transcends this human propensity. 
(Hutchens 73–74). Time is transcendent when it is the time of the Other. Paradoxically it is also 
immanent. It is perhaps what T.S. Eliot would call in Four Quartets the still point.  
 
In this context the messiah is anyone who takes on the sufferings of others (Levinas 89). Thus, 
when anyone is responsible for the Other they are the messiah.  This messianicity is espoused by 
Michael K., for example in the movement of his mother inland, in his growing of vegetables and his 
sheltering of the child in the camp.  It is further exemplified in his renunciation of Being, in his 
apparently passive acceptance of the domination of, for example, the camp guards, and 
paradoxically his eluding of their attempts to reduce him to the Same.  He makes manifest an 
Otherwise than Being that rejects and transcends the appropriatory tendencies of the society in 
which he lives.   
 
Mr Vercueil can be viewed in a similar light.  By leading Mrs Curren to let go of her ways of 
thinking, he opens her up to a new dimension of responsibility to the Other.  He becomes the 
instrument for her fecundity, her ability to pass her spirit on to future generations.  Both Michael 
and Mr Vercueil are essentially marked by a lack of representation, they do not have a full identity.  
In other words they are unknowable. Their alterity is protected. There is a strong air of mystery 
about Mr Vercueil.  He is almost completely unrepresentable, unknown, unknowable, 
unassimilable, unappropriable with an alterity that cannot be approached let alone reduced to the 
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Same.  The gap between him and Mrs Curren is unbridgeable although she shares, her car, her bed, 
her food, her music with him.  He reciprocates, showing her his world but one can’t share his 
thoughts or his soul. As I mentioned in Chapter One there is a way of reading both Michael K. and 
Mr Vercueil in terms of angelology: both being angels guiding people to and through the gates of 
death.  Their role is to nurture life to a beyond of Being (Keck 9). Luce Irigaray in an Ethics of 
Sexual Difference makes an interesting comment about angels as “mediators of that which has not 
happened, of what is still going to happen, of what is on the horizon” (5). In this context there is, in 
Mr Vercueil and Michael, a fecundity of time in their transference to the beyond of Being, where 
there is a generation of life which is not materially restricted. Levinas writes:  “The Messiah only 
comes to him who waits” (Levinas, Difficult Freedom 92).   Both Michael K. and Mr Vercueil 
transcend time in the sense of not seeming to be pushing toward some event.  While Mrs Curren is 
distressed by the event of her approaching death which is coming toward her,  this is not the case 
for Mr Vercueil and Michael who are not fixated by the imminence of death, of time having a limit 
rather than time flowing past them unobstructed and as such having no finitude.  In Judaism the 
messiah comes after the night.  There must be a passing of darkness before the coming of the light 
and of the messiah.  In this there is a coming of life after the death of Mrs Curren.  We could not 
have light unless there was darkness. Light is not discernible unless there is darkness. “It is given to 
the rooster to discern light from dark and to announce it so” (Levinas, Difficult Freedom 92–93).    
 
It is given to Mrs Curren to discern the light from the darkness, to see the intractable violence in the 
blathering politicians and their destructive infantility.  She is given the discernment to see the 
intractable incalculable violence, to see the light from the dark of the society in which she resides. 
 
Compromised by Mrs Curren, John is shot by the police and becomes another statistic in the age of 
iron.  The fecundity of the iron generation results in the revolution that gives tomorrow a new 
meaning, which results in an overturning of the old and a disturbance of the new.  Though she calls 
for heroism and realises the absolute decrepitude and injustice around her, she is powerless to do 
anything about it.  She thinks in finite time, seeing death as an end of time, thus she sees the 
children as heroic beings but limited by finite time.  The children of ‘Iron’ do not assume this 
limited view, but they are, rather, emboldened by their ‘familial being’; they assume an infinite time 
and are thus not caught in the web that is crushing Mrs Curren: 
 
Now that child is buried and we walk upon him.  Let me tell you, when I walk upon this 
land, this South Africa, I have a gathering feeling of walking upon black faces.  They are 
dead but their spirit has not left them.  They lie there heavy and obdurate, waiting for my 
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feet to pass, waiting for me to go, waiting to be raised up again.  Millions of figures of pig-
iron floating under the skin of the earth.  The age of iron waiting to return. (Coetzee, Age of 
Iron 115) 
 
It is possible to read Life & Times of Michael K. as a world devoid of fecundity. It is a story with a 
stark, bleak unforgiving landscape apparently without time or life. The sole dominant life forming 
the novel is a socially challenged, facially scarred person who is exiled from society and the state, 
who is constantly uprooted, attempting to transcend a society committed to the annihilation and 
rejection of the Other as Other. He exists in a society where time is not generated from a 
responsibility for the Other, but which is consistently designed to maintain an institutionalised 
exploitation of the Other in a series of work and education camps. In the camps, time is synchronic; 
there is no past or future, only the interminable present; without hope. 
 
Michael is advised by an inmate to accept the camp as the best available means of life for him.  The 
bleakness of the landscape and the lack of representation in the text gives emphasis to the relation 
without relation between Michael and the Other – whoever that Other might be.  It is a story of 
Michael and the Other in a world hostile to life in the time of the Other.  Yet this coming of the 
Other shows in the very aridity of this nothingness, a time from which something as small as a 
tendril of green, as the snows melt, shows life.  This we see lightly sketched throughout the story, a 
story of becoming, a story that invokes, always, something to come in time, which can only be 
justice for that which is and that which was. Coetzee’s work gives no centrality to place. Rather 
there is a centrality given to persons such that any sense of place grounded in a logocentric presence 
is diminished and, almost, made nonsensical.  What is given precedence is a sense of the Other such 
that this Other, although part of the social, is dis-assembled from the cultural where the cultural has 
its locus in ‘place’. There is no doubt in this nonrelationship to place, a strong degree of fecundity 
where fecundity is related in this sense to the attempt not only to relate to the Other and to give life, 
but is there, more importantly, to sustain its futural dimension. Fecundity is about tomorrow.  It 
ruptures today as a monolith giving difference a chance to express something new and variant.  It is 
this inhabiting of today with a new tomorrow that is the core of fecundity’s promise. Fecundity 
irretrievably breaks the stranglehold that today has on tomorrow, opening up the possibility of 
justice (Handelman, 205–208). Another example of the ethical focus of Coetzee’s works is made 
manifest in terms of time rather than place.  David Lurie in Disgrace loses his sense of place when 
he leaves the university.  It is never regained as he contends with a nomadic life, one where he 
cannot find himself as part of any community.  Likewise, Michael K. and Mrs Curren have no sense 
of place and show no interest in one. Their interest is temporal rather than spatial. 
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The letter from Mrs Curren is a detailing of the past, a document pertaining to her holocaust, which 
she sends into the future as an atonement and a message of that which is gone before, which only 
the fecundity of her daughter can heal in a time to come. This, again, is a call for justice for that 
which is and which was.  The past is irrevocably with us in anachronous history.  It is only in the 
fecundity of tomorrow’s children that the suffering of the past such as genocide can be addressed.  
There is, for Levinas, an immeasurable goodness in fecundity (Hutchens 87). 
 
Catherine Chalier offers another possible reading of Levinas in terms of fecundity which I find 
quite compelling.  She writes: “If man is for the Other he is not for death but for infinity and as such 
for the beyond of death. This orientation of being for the Other is echoed in paternity where time in 
its rupture triumphs over age” (Chalier 175). If this is true for paternity, which is always uncertain, 
then it is even more so for maternity. Chalier argues that Levinas regards the feminine as being very 
involved in disrupting the closure of totality and thus, most importantly, in creating a displacement 
in the hegemony of Being.  The importance of fecundity is not only in its relation to the feminine 
but in the relation it has to the future.  That is, the messianic future, or the time of the Other that can 
come now. This messianicity is effected by the feminine but not its difference from the masculine, 
which is only relevant in its asymmetry, for it is in this asymmetry and excess that the feminine 
points to a beyond of being that effectively ruptures being.  Chalier writes: 
 
the other as feminine is both discreet and exorbitant in its ultramateriality. The feminine is 
both profane and incomparably excellent.  There is a certain lapse or failure of being 
signalled by the feminine, a lack with regard to being and therefore a refusal to take on the 
reciprocity of symmetrical relations. (Chalier 22) 
Chalier is suggesting in the feminine an antipathy to the neutrality of Being, which Mrs Curren in 
assembling the events in her letter that are important to her: this autobiography, this life narrative, 
contradicts the pretentiousness of historical analysis which seeks to impose its own arrogant 
understanding of what was important and what was relevant (Hutchens 23).  In other words, 
Coetzee suggests here that people may give meanings to history but neglect the meaning of those 
who actually lived it.  Thus Mrs Curren gives a profound meaning to history which it is perilous to 
neglect.  She moves a small ark, her extended family through the ocean, in the turmoil of a 
revolution, facing the death throes of a state set in a time past that is to be aborted by a call for 
justice in a time to come.  The despair she feels, as the weight of an immemorial past weighs on her, 
is leavened by the presence, a presence that is not present due to the transcendence of Mr Vercueil, 
both in lack of representation and in terms of lack of connection to that which is. Transcendence of 
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the Other is about the God or as Levinas would prefer A-Dieu or to-God beyond Being. But 
paradoxically as mentioned earlier to-God or Infinity is immanent in the Other, that is the face of 
the Other. In other words, for Mrs Curren, Mr Vercueil is an enigma, a not present presence who 
lacks connection with anybody and anything.  He borders the material world, edging nearer but 
never actually there.  He is never present in a time that synchronises with anyone else, either past or 
future. He, like Michael K., questions the animal / human / angel divide that underpins humanism. 
Questioning of these distinctions is also quite strong in, for example, Disgrace and The Lives of 
Animals, where Coetzee goes to some lengths to problematise the humanist assumption that we are 
superior to animals.  This is for me particularly evident when the marauding rapists shoot the dogs 
in the kennels: “One dog, shot through the chest, dies at once; another, with, a gaping throat wound, 
sits down heavily, flattening its ears, following with its gaze the movements of this being who does 
not even bother to administer a coup de grace”(Coetzee, Disgrace 95).  There is in these actions the 
psychopathic infliction of pain and death.   
 
It seems elsewhere in the novel that dogs are superior to humans when it comes to ethics. The 
euthanizing of the animals even with all the care and attention that Bev and David bequeath on 
them, has something of the hallmarks of Auschwitz and Treblinka. Although the prisoners had no 
regard for their captors as the dogs do for theirs. Bev and David act as the anointed ministers of 
death to the creatures, ironically satirising a human propensity to play God.  To see only humans as 
an Other is to deny what Coetzee is suggesting in this novel. “Because animals trust her, should he 
trust her too, to teach him a lesson? Animals trust her, and she uses that trust to liquidate them.  
What is the lesson there?” Coetzee, Disgrace 210).  Yet David is aware of “a generous affection 
streaming out toward him from the dog.  Arbitrarily, unconditionally he has been adopted; the dog 
would die for him he knows […] The dog is fascinated by the sound of the banjo.  When he strums 
the strings, the dog sits up, cocks its head, listens.  When he hums Theresa’s line, and the humming 
begins to swell with feeling [...] smacks its lips and seems on the point of singing too, or howling.” 
(Coetzee, Disgrace 215).This dog is put down by David even as he wonders whether to include him 
in an opera he is composing about Byron and Theresa.  One is reminded of a story about the 
Commandant of Auschwitz who, whilst listening to Wagner on the balcony of his residence, would 
occasionally, without warning and at random, shoot a prisoner.   
 
Fecundity is about the arrival of the Other in a time to come. Attridge interprets the story of The 
Master of Petersburgh in terms of Derrida’s arrivant.  Again Coetzee uses the third person and the 
present tense to emphasise the Illeity of the Other.  This Illeity is the arrivant, a singular term 
glossed by Derrida as the singularity of an unknowable neutral arrivant (Gaston 48). The waiting for 
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the arrivant is both painful and protracted, echoing the birth of a child or the death of a loved one.  
In his waiting Dostoevsky embraces the beggar as an Other, to whom hospitality is due.  This novel 
is a prelude to Dostoevsky’s Possessed and resists the totalising and rationalising position of 
Nachaev, the villain in Dostoevsky’s story.  What, though, is singular about this novel is that this 
protracted arriving of the arrivant is a betrayal of the process of writing itself. It is perhaps similar 
to Samuel Beckett in his writing the self.  There is in Coetzee, as perhaps with Beckett, a strong 
feeling of autobiography with the fiction. The arrivant is a monstrous Other that must be welcomed, 
such is the logic of the hospitality imbued in a Levinasian ethics.  Attridge in The Ethics of Reading
sums up the dilemma beautifully this way: 
 
As soon as we attempt to categorise the newcomer, to apply terms like “good” and “evil,” 
“welcome” or “unwelcome” we begin the inevitable process of appropriation and 
domestication – a process whose inevitability requires that the preparation for the Other 
never cease. (135)  
 
In Mrs Curren we see the movement of a woman whose approaching death opens her to a 
movement from within herself to displacement, an alienation from the present, to the future.  Due to 
this alienation from a world to which she was once rooted, she sees the world differently; being 
perhaps in her displacement more open to its needs, and certainly jarred by the violence about her to 
adopt an ethical position that is beyond morality.  This is something for which she searches.  In this 
quest she is guided by Mr Vercueil, a guide who gives her a perspective she has not had before: the 
possibility of the beyond of being, the beyond of death.  She comes to death in an anti-Heideggerian 
way, as something that is not a limit, only the negation of Being and which can be transcended, and 
is transcended by the act of our reading the letter. Transcendence and immanence are very 
significant terms for Levinas. They are something like the Saying and the Said in their seriature. In 
this step beyond, there is not the annihilation of life as we would have with Heidegger but a 
continuation of life evident in the fact that her spirit lives on and we as readers respond and are 
responsible for it.  It has a certain exemplary fecundity that cannot be reduced.  We mourn for the 
past immemorially lost, and the future which can come now, and must do to be given justice. 
 
Drago in Slow Man is another generation mourning the past of Paul Rayment.  There is an 
exchange between Drago and Paul that exemplifies the closure of Paul when Drago asks for the 
modem and finds there is not one.  
 
70
“Do you hate things when they are new, Mr Rayment? [...] I’m not you know blaming you. 
It’s just the style, the style of everything.”  He sits back in his chair, waves a hand casually 
over as he says everything.  “It’s cool.  I’m just asking. Isn’t there anything new you 
like?”(178) 
 
Paul replies: “I have been overtaken by time, by history. This flat and everything in it, has been 
overtaken” (178). But Drago opens up another possibility for Paul. “So you can choose,” says 
Drago.  “That’s all I’m saying ‘” (178). Drago reminds Paul that each instant of time is not 
conditioned by the previous instant.  This fecundity in time opens up the possibility for something 
entirely new. It opens up the possibility of justice when there is a mourning for the past.  It is this 
openness to the unknown, the unknowable that leads to justice.  Hence we have the overwhelming 
imperative of literature, which is undefinable and thus unknowable.  
 
Children are an exemplification of this Otherness, with each new generation in time inexplicably 
different from that which has preceded it. Elizabeth Costello takes some time to enlighten Paul on 
the fecundity of Drago: 
 
‘Poor Paul!’ she says.  ‘So late in life, so monkish, as you say, so set in your ways, and now 
so grumpy too! What a reckless venture into childminding? In the abstract I am sure you 
would like to love young Drago, but the facts of life keep getting in the way.  We cannot 
love by an act of will, Paul. We have to learn. That is why souls descend from their realm on 
high and submit to being born again: so that, as they grow up in our company, they can lead 
us along the hard road of loving.  From the beginning you have glimpsed something angelic 
in Drago, and I am sure you are not wrong. Drago has remained in touch with his other-
worldly origins longer than most children.  Overcome your disappointment, your irritation.  
Learn from Drago while you can.  One of these days the last wisps of glory will vanish into 
the air and he will simply be one of us. 
 
‘You think I am crazy, don’t you, or deluded? But remember I have raised two children, 
real-life, unmusical children; you have raised none. I know what children are for; you are 
still ignorant. So pay heed when I speak, even when I speak in figures.  We have children in 
order that we may learn to love and serve.  Through our children we become the servants of 
time.  Look into your heart.  Ask yourself whether you have the reserves of fortitude you 
will need for the journey, and the stamina.  If not, perhaps you should withdraw.  It is not 
too late.’ (Coetzee, Slow 181–2) 
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There is a certain didacticism in Elizabeth Costello that is evident in this text as well as in Elizabeth 
Costello: Eight Lessons. This capacity to enlighten the ethically challenged brings her no applause. 
She is barely understood as Paul comments to himself: 
 
Speaking in figures.  Angels from on high.   It is the most mystifying speech she has made 
since the hocus-pocus about the woman with the dark glasses.  Is she light headed from 
fasting? Is she trying to make a fool of him again? Ought he to offer her more than a cup of 
tea? He gives her a hard look, as hard as he can.  But she does not waver.  She believes what 
she is saying, it would seem. (Coetzee, Slow 182) 
 
In a recent lecture given at the University of Queensland on the 3 of August, 2007, Derek Attridge 
highlighted the comic influences of Samuel Beckett on Coetzee. In The Unnamable, Beckett’s 
narrator has these last words:  “I don’t know, I’ll never know, in the silence you don’t know, you 
must go on, I can’t go on, I’ll go on” (418). I had the sense of an existential despair being worked 
through. It is difficult to see these scenes in Coetzee as comic. I read the scenes as tragic. Take the 
following example in Slow Man (101) as an example, where Paul is required to be blind to match 
Marianna’s disability:  
 
‘Just a paste of flour and water. It goes over your eyes. Have no fear it will not hurt you. 
Why must you wear it? Because Marianna does not want you to see her.  She insists.(102) 
 
You could read this as emblematic of our tragic western history where the Other is required to be 
reduced to the Same. Coetzee may well be imitating Beckett’s awareness of the hopelessness and or 
absurdity of the human condition to which reliance on the logos has reduced us. 
 
Time closes for Levinas with the removal of the Other.  The solitary human exists without time. 
There is for him no justice nor is there a future or a past.  The incoming of the Other, whether that 
Other be a human, animal, vegetable or literature, heralds not only time but the possibility and the 
impossibility of justice.  There are strong similarities between the work of Beckett, Kafka and 
Coetzee, so much so that they almost form a tradition of their own. In Kafka’s Metamorphosis and 
Coetzee’s Michael K. with his animal similes and Beckett’s autography give the sense of a tradition 
running from Kafka through Beckett to Coetzee.  It is one that is not easily mapped, but one that 
nevertheless resonates in terms of an ethics beyond Being. They speak of a justice that can never 
arrive, there is always more to come.  In other words justice is never complete, closed or total; it is 
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like love, requiring more and being open to more.  The introduction of the Other, whether the Other 
be a human or literature, is the advent of time.  The fact of literature is that it never ceases to be 
central to the Other.  It constitutes time and ruptures the closure of death.  
 
In the death of the Other there is always left a trace, and so it is  with the death of John and Bheki; 
Mrs Curren is haunted by the trace of them.  This trace of the Other can be multiplied beyond 
Infinity. Yet before she goes she acknowledges the trace of John as the Other. 
 
I want to tell you that, despite my dislike of him, he is with me more clearly, more 
piercingly than Bheki has ever been.  He is with me or I am with him: him or the trace of 
him. (Coetzee, Age 159) 
 
In the time of John’s death she narrates to her daughter in her letter: 
 
within this interval there is no time, though his heart beats time.  I am here in my room in 
the night, but I am also with him, all the time, as I am with you across the seas hovering. 
(Coetzee, Age 160) 
 
This interval is the one between the image of him watching the door and death.  There is no Other 
there and so there is no time.  But for John and Bheki, the children of iron denied life by an 
imperious state that closed time to them, their lives are resurrected in the text of this letter, and they 
live on, escaping their state sanctioned closure. Time flows remorselessly for them, flowing out of 
their responsibility for the Other.  This Other is of course those present and those yet to come and 
those past.  The time is anachronous.  This is how time is not an object; rather time issues out of a 
being for the Other.  Mrs Curren recognises also that though she is gone, dead, she is still with him 
and also with her daughter, who is spatially far away. This defies what we may consider normal yet 
we find it not so strange to speak or write in this way because there is an established understanding 
or acceptance of this phenomenon that defies the rational. There is an acceptance of what it is to go 
beyond the Being of beings from where time comes.  This gives time a dimension, a fullness, a 
weight, that it does not enjoy in the fullness of clock time20 or psychological, objective time.  The 
time of the Other is fuller than either psychological time or clock  time.  The time of the other 
comes from being responsible for the Other and requires an action of responsibility for the Other.  It 
is not synchronic but is both diachronic and anachronic thus it transcends the boundaries of the 
 
20 Aristotelian time is time inseparable from change.  A counted motion can be a clock for counting other motions 
(McLure 181). 
 
73
present overflowing excessively into the past and into the future.  It is in the fecundity of anachrony 
that time enjoys the status, the power, the leverage of the Middle Voice; that voice which transcends 
the active and passive voices.  This is the voice that steadfastly refuses to own or to be owned and 
thus escapes the ontology of being.  It is a voice that echoes a thin silence when it speaks which is 
the voice of the Other who is wholly Other. This thinking defies the rational.  
 
Simone Weil links Infinity to silence in this way according to Henry Finch: 
 
silence as a positive sensation more positive than sound, what could this mean? When 
Beethoven was stone deaf he wrote his last Quartets, though he couldn’t hear a single sound.  
Many critics and commentators have commentated on these pieces that they express a 
‘music beyond music’ or a ‘music beyond sound,’ a movement of spirit.  When Simone 
Weil speaks of a silence ‘which is not an absence of sound’ is this what she experienced? 
We recall also the Pythagorean ‘music of the spheres,’ which is so omnipresent that it 
cannot be heard. (Finch 47) 
 
George Cantor has demonstrated the existence of an infinity beyond infinity or in fact a number of 
infinities. Weil speaks in the same vein of a silence beyond silence and of a number of infinities 
beyond infinity (Finch 50). Aquinas saw “angels as the announcers of divine silence” (Fox 23). 
Silence is the beyond of being.  The Middle Voice speaks in silence. The silence is the Saying 
which punctuates the Said that makes time durational rather than countable:  “it is in the 
irreconcilable difference of alterity that Levinas founds the fundamental relationship with the 
Other” (Pinchevski 71). The silence has no voice other than the voice of the Other.  
 
The silent world is a world that comes to us from the Other […] Thus silence is not a simple 
absence of speech; speech lies in the depths of silence like a laughter perfidiously held back.  
It is the inverse of language; the interlocutor has given a sign, but has declined every 
interpretation; this is the silence that terrifies. (Totality & Infinity 91) 
 
Michael K. can be said to echo this beyond of Being in his habitual silence, which is his refusal to 
speak.  The medical officer encourages him: 
 
‘Tell us what we want to know, then we will leave you alone.’ 
I paused; he stared stonily back. ‘Talk, Michaels,’ I resumed. ‘You see how easy it is to talk, 
now talk.’ (Coetzee Life140) 
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Michael is being pressured by the Medical Officer into talking about his supposed clandestine past.  
His silent response is echoed throughout the text. He is, very like Mr Vercueil, bordering the 
material but never actually there. He resists the fecundity of his own children. 
 
How fortunate that I have no children, he thought: how fortunate that I have no desire to 
father. I would not know what to do with a child out here in the heart of the country, who 
would need milk and clothes and friends and schooling. I would fail in my duties.  I would 
be the worst of fathers.  Whereas it is not hard to live a life that consists merely of passing 
time. (Coetzee, Life 104)   
 
His paternity is evidenced and expressed in his relationship with the earth and its fruits. It is only in 
his relationship with the earth that he is able to rupture time and open up tomorrow. The time of the 
Other is the time that ruptures the totality of rational thought that seeks to confine it to specific 
boundaries, to essentially encamp the self either as a possessed or a possessor. The anachronicity of 
the silence of the Middle Voice is a Saying that opens up yesterday and tomorrow as an event that 
can come now.  The time of the Other is, in other words, inherently messianic.  This picture of time, 
which is one that posits a ruptured and rupturing temporality that makes tomorrow and yesterday 
shatter the isolation of today is something that opens up the possibility /impossibility of justice.  
Time of the Other is something that defies thought as it is beyond the ontological and defies 
knowability.  It can be spoken, thought and written, but is at the same time essentially beyond 
speech, beyond writing and beyond thought.  It is ungraspable.  Time is beyond ‘is’ and at the same 
time ‘is’.  There is in this time of the Other a seriature and an ambivalence that cannot be mastered 
or measured. 
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CONCLUSION 
 
In the preceding chapters on Saying, Testimony and Fecundity, I have given an account of how 
some of Coetzee’s fiction can be read through the central philosophical concepts of Levinas’ ethics.  
In Coetzee’s work, we can appreciate an art recuperating in its Testimony, its Saying and its 
Fecundity a process of recollecting (welcoming) and opening up the past, present and future, not the 
future present, but a future that inhabits a different order of time. This movement of the relationship 
to the Other in its ethicality is something that shines through in the literary works of Coetzee.  It is 
something that opens up to the possibility of a justice that is available now. The Saying, which is a 
testifying to Infinity, has within it a fecundity that is, in its ethicality, a breaking out of the closure 
of the Said, rupturing the totality of a thought that revels in the literal and rational and opens time to 
the messianic.   
 
The explicit connection between ethics and literature is that both are Sayings on the other side of 
the Said. In opposition to the visual Levinas prefers the aural, which is the voice.  Here he believes 
lies the ethical in its most forceful, most emphatic.  Here the voice resonates in its work as it 
becomes most developed in its work of movement toward the Other.   
 
The links between the Saying, Testimony and Fecundity lie in a transcendence of its voice.  This 
transcendence of the Middle Voice; that is, the voice that refuses in its ethicality to appropriate the 
other or be appropriated is evident in poetry and literature and, as I have shown, in J M Coetzee’s 
novels. 
 
Coetzean writing rejoices in refusing the closure that the Said brings.  It rejects the binaries, the 
hierarchies and the closure of a representation that denies the Other. Instead it rejoices in the face to 
face or, as I have argued, the Middle Voice which always testifies in its resounding cymballing to 
Infinity which is an opening to a transcendence that inhabits or is typified by the Middle Voice 
 
I have argued that Coetzee’s literature is more significant than instrumental readings give it credit 
for. The importance of the Middle Voice emphasises an ethical reading of time as the underlying 
fabric that pervades all of what we are and have been and will be.  Its ethicality lies in its capacity to 
be open to an immemorial past and a future that is to come. Unless we actively mourn this past, we 
deny the present a future. 
 
76
Michael, devoid of face and voice, is a product of a murderous system of exclusion that inhabits the 
visual and the beautiful; and fulfils a system of exclusion and denial and seeks to rigorously deny 
Otherness.  This facelessness, this voicelessness, is emblematic of a totalitarian regime.  Strangely, 
in the face of this system of exclusion, Michael is able to find a place and a voice.  He inhabits in 
his Otherness the faultlines of the system, finding a space and time that paradoxically inhabits, both 
dimensions.  This transcendence of Michael K. acknowledged by the Medical Officer, is also 
noticed by Mrs Curren about Mr Vercueil.   
 
The importance of the Middle Voice for literary criticism in my view lies in its capacity to operate 
as a theoretical term that welcomes the Other. I have made some connections between the 
Holocaust in the thesis and Coetzee and Levinas because both authors are products of totalitarian 
regimes who seek to imagine ethical relationships beyond the closure on the Other that these 
political systems express. I have also drawn on an approach to the Holocaust that shows it as an 
expression of a thought, with a valorisation of the rational, a faith without works, and a denial of the 
Other, that gives obeisance to an ontotheological entity that is, unsurprisingly, remarkably 
anthropomorphic. This holocausticality is still very much part of the fabric of our society.  It is as 
much an issue as it has ever been.  We have continuous evidence of the genocidal imperative of 
humans from the Sudan to Kosovo to Burma that seems intrinsically part of the fabric of our Being.   
 
As Australia moves into the twenty-first century, the wings of Benjamin’s Angel of History are 
beating frantically at the debris piling up in what is called progress.  A land bereft of trees, soil and 
water, as Deborah Bird Rose reminds us, is ‘Wild Country’. But it can be healed. This is similar to 
the argument made by Rose in Reports from a Wild Country: Ethics for Decolonisation when she 
situates Levinas in an Australian context and argues for a future for Australian people both 
indigenous, and immigrant, and a future for its land destroyed by a system of thought that has no 
place for the Other. In arguing for the future, Rose is aware of the crucial importance of 
recuperating the past. In her awareness of the time of the Other, so crucial to the existence of us all, 
Rose argues that what is crucial for our future is a healing of the past. What is exciting is the 
awareness that the past has to be and can be recuperated, and that that awareness is central to the 
thought of the people who have been victims of an Australian Shoah.  
 
This recuperation of the past requires what Derrida would call mourning, while Levinas uses the 
idea of Testimony to convey such witnessing to the past. The concept of progressive time demands 
the continual emergence of something new which demands an erasing of the old so that no trace is 
left. This tracelessness involves buildings, landscapes and people. Building on Rose, it could be 
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argued that postcolonialism often theorizes within the construct of ‘year zero’, embracing the fiction 
that after colonialism everything will be alright in some future time. Another way of disrupting the 
teleological effect of postcolonialism is by following Aileen Moreton-Robinson in using the term 
‘postcolonising’ as a more accurate reflection of the relationship between Indigenous and non-
Indigenous people. “I use the verb postcolonizing to signify the active, the current and the 
continuing nature of the colonizing relationship that positions us as belonging but not 
belonging.”(Moreton–Robinson “I still call Australia Home” 38)  
 
Coetzee reminded us very recently that the anti-terror laws to be introduced into Australia were the 
same laws, so inimical to justice that maintained apartheid (Price, The Australian 25 Oct., 2005. 
p.1).  These laws that denied the Other are so much part of the fabric of our society that their 
exclusion of certain individuals and groups from the community of nations is seen as normal. Any 
questioning of this exclusionary regime is considered a threat to our social and economic well-
being.  
 
To maintain the closure that history demands, he argues, is to condemn the revenants that have 
gone before us and consequently to deny us a tomorrow.  There must be mourning and only then 
will there be healing. Man, Lev Shestov maintains must choose between Athens and Jerusalem. Do 
we need to return to the God of Abraham, Isaac and Jacob or do we maintain the God of Athens 
with its rational logic or neither? It is interesting to look at Primo Levi, the chemist and Holocaust 
survivor and wonder where he would stand with this question having witnessed the destruction 
wrought by Athens and its rational logic. 
 
Vasily Grossman in Life and Fate had this to say about the twentieth century and its dependence on 
the rational logic of science: 
 
Fascism has rejected the concept of a separate individuality, the concept of ‘a man’, and 
operates only with vast aggregates.  Contemporary physics speaks of the greater or lesser 
probability of occurrences within this or that aggregate of individual particles.  And are not 
the terrible mechanics of Fascism founded on the principle of quantum politics, of political 
probability?  (94–95).    
 
In the heart of humanity there exists that unquenchable desire for the secret, the mysterious, the 
messianic, the Saying that is to come. No matter how wonderful the fruits of the Said are, in as 
much as we have it seems unlimited power to define and exclude the Other, there is within a deep 
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and abiding need of the Saying that if and when denied it leads to a diminution in people that 
eventually leads to a decimation of peoples.  In Coetzee’s work I find haunting characters who not 
only mourn deeply the present but also the past.  They in their desolation still strike out in hope for 
something that can only be Justice. This is echoed most beautifully by Deborah Bird Rose in an 
Australian context when she calls for a healing of this Wild Country. 
 
In conclusion, this thesis has given a reading of Levinas that specifically addresses the work of 
Coetzee. It shows how ethics gives voice to a Saying in the Middle Voice which testifies to a time 
that comes from the Other. Like Levinas, Coetzee’s refusal to represent the Other in the present 
recuperates a past and a future as fecundity. For both authors, testimony is the key not to a future 
present but to a future to come that is the harbinger of justice. By exploring the relationship time 
has in diachrony, anachrony and messianicity, they expose the irreducible importance of time to the 
maintenance of a relationship with the Other that is ethical.  
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